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DOING MORE OR DOING LESS FOR THE 
ENVIRONMENT: SHEDDING LIGHT ON 
EPA’S STEALTH METHOD OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 
Ronald H. Rosenberg* 
Abstract: Since the 1970s, environmental protection goals have gone from 
general statements of political desire to highly articulated systems of envi-
ronmental regulation implemented by federal, state, and local govern-
ments. Environmental statutes have been enacted giving administrative 
agencies such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the re-
sponsibility for translating broad policy goals into specific regulatory re-
quirements. Through its enforcement program, EPA seeks to assure that 
these general goals are achieved by individual actors. This Article exam-
ines a recent trend in EPA’s practices, increased reliance on internal 
agency methods of enforcement. The study analyzes EPA’s administrative 
enforcement system with particular emphasis on the imposition of civil 
penalties. Its central conclusion is that EPA’s administrative enforcement 
dominates the Agency’s enforcement practices, dwarfing judicially super-
vised enforcement. In addition, this mechanism yields outcomes emphasiz-
ing settlement, at process at variance with EPA rules that renders outcomes 
in a context largely invisible from public scrutiny. 
Introduction 
 Government regulation of environmental quality is relatively new, 
with the main environmental protection statutes having been first en-
acted by Congress only during the 1970s. This decade witnessed the pas-
sage of at least eighteen major environmental protection statutes, includ-
ing the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Toxic Substances Con-
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trol Act (TSCA).1 This unprecedented period of legislation represented 
the starting point in the development of national environmental policy.2 
 In 1970, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or 
Agency) was established to act as the principal environmental policy-
maker and regulation-implementing authority under the legislation that 
would soon be enacted.3 Acting under these congressionally legislated 
powers, EPA embarked upon the complex task of designing and execut-
ing a comprehensive set of regulations establishing environmental qual-
ity norms to protect the nation’s air, water, and land, as well as human 
and ecosystem health and wellbeing.4 As a regulatory agency, EPA has 
translated these diverse statutory directives into a sweeping and complex 
set of environmental rules affecting a variety of activities undertaken by 
both private firms and by individuals.5 These standards set a wide array 
                                                                                                                      
1 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629, 2641–2656, 
2661–2671, 2681–2692 (2000 & Supp. 2004); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1387 (2000 & Supp. 2004); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 
Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act of 1976, §§ 6901–6992k (2000 & Supp. 2004). Other examples include 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 
1972, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (1972), Noise Control Act of 
1972, Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Endangered Species Act of 1973, Safe Drink-
ing Water Act of 1974 (SWDA), Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act 
of 1974, Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, National Forest Management Act 
of 1976, Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (1978). 
2 Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law 67–97 (2004) (describ-
ing the 1970s as a period of “Building a Road” towards national environmental policy). 
3 Environmental Protection Agency, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970). The estab-
lishment of EPA was achieved during the presidency of Richard M. Nixon in 1970. Id. Fol-
lowing the signing of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) on New Years Day, 
1970, President Nixon proclaimed the decade to be one of environmental transformation 
in his State of the Union address. An Agency for the Environment, EPA History, US EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/origins6.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2008) [here-
inafter An Agency for the Environment]. During the spring of 1970, the President decided 
to establish a separate regulatory agency to manage the enforcement of environmental 
policy in the federal government. Id. On July 9, 1970, he transmitted Reorganization Plan 
Number 3 to the Senate and the House of Representatives to inform Congress of his wish 
to consolidate functions of many departments, bureaus, and other diverse federal offices 
to form a new EPA. Id.; see Environmental Protection Agency, 35 Fed. Reg. at 15,623–26. 
Hearings were held over the summer of 1970 and by December 2, 1970, the EPA was in 
operation. See An Agency for the Environment, supra. 
4 Building an Agency, EPA History, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/ 
formative3.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). 
5 See id. 
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of performance, monitoring, and recordkeeping responsibilities, and, as 
federal regulations, they carry the force of law.6 
 However, those regulated by EPA rules do not immediately come 
into compliance with the them. Environmental regulations are not self-
enforcing and frequently, when they ask regulated entities to assume 
new economic costs or to change their methods of operation, they are 
resisted.7 As part of federal environmental policy, EPA has also devel-
oped both coercive and cooperative tactics to achieve compliance with 
its many rules.8 Using the threat of punishment to encourage voluntary 
compliance, EPA has adopted an enforcement program that threatens 
noncompliant behavior with a variety of judicial and administrative 
sanctions, believed necessary to achieve the environmental goals of 
federal law.9 Environmental law authorizes a range of enforcement 
techniques that can impose both civil remedies—injunctive and finan-
cial—and criminal penalties.10 However, both of these enforcement 
methods require a federal enforcement lawsuit.11 Federal environ-
mental statutes provide an alternative enforcement route to resource-
intensive and time-consuming judicial intervention: EPA’s issuance of 
administrative injunctive and penalty orders.12 Increasingly, EPA has 
selected this in-house approach by taking civil enforcement actions 
within the agency’s own administrative law structure to punish envi-
ronmental violators.13 
                                                                                                                      
6 An Agency for the Environment, supra note 3. Professor Koch has described this 
phenomena in the following terms: “Legislative rules are rules made pursuant to dele-
gated authority to make rules. Because they are an extension of a legislative act, they have 
the force of law and are subject to very limited judicial review . . . . The drafters of the 
[Administrative Procedure Act] characterized these rules as ‘true administrative legisla-
tion.’” Charles H. Koch, Administrative Law and Practice § 4.11[2] (2d ed. 1997). 
7 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(F) (2000) (discussing state implemen-
tation plans for primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards). Regula-
tions adopted pursuant to environmental statutes become enforceable on their own terms 
or by virtue of being incorporated into permits or licenses issued to an individual, firm, or 
institution. See id. Upon breach of the conditions imposed by the regulations, the govern-
ment or citizen groups may seek enforcement and penalties against the violator in court or 
in an administrative proceeding. See, e.g., id. 
8 See Joel A. Mintz et al., Environmental Enforcement: Cases and Materials 5 
(2007) [hereinafter Environmental Enforcement]. 
9 See id. at 3–5. 
10 See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b)–(c) (2000) (describing civil 
actions and criminal penalties). 
11 See, e.g., id. 
12 Environmental Enforcement, supra note 8, at 82–83. 
13 See id. at 81. 
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 During the last decade, these administrative enforcement cases 
have become so numerous that they far outnumber court-ordered ac-
tions and result in the payment of millions of dollars in civil penalties 
and in the imposition of injunctive compliance orders.14 This practice is 
so pervasive that one recent assessment has estimated that approxi-
mately ninety percent of EPA’s enforcement actions are administrative, 
not judicial, in nature.15 For example, in fiscal year 2006, EPA data re-
ported that the agency initiated 4647 administrative complaints while 
issuing 1438 compliance orders and imposing 4624 final administrative 
penalty orders for approximately $42 million in fines.16 To put these 
                                                                                                                      
14 See EPA, Compliance and Enforcement Annual Results: Numbers at a Glance, 
Fiscal Year 2006 (2006), available at www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/end- 
ofyear/eoy2006/fy2006numbers.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Numbers at a Glance]. Contrary 
to popular belief, civil penalties paid by defendants do not become the property of EPA, 
but rather they are paid into the U.S. Treasury. Steel Co., AKA Chicago Steel & Pickling 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998). In Steel Co., the U.S. Supreme 
Court addressed this issue within the context of an Emergency Planning and Citizen Right-
to-Know Act (EPCRA) citizen suit enforcement action. Id. There, Justice Scalia wrote that 
“civil penalties authorized by the statute . . . might be viewed as a sort of compensation or 
redress to respondent if they were payable to respondent. But they are not. These penal-
ties—the only damages authorized by EPCRA—are payable to the United States Treasury.” 
Id. In general, all civil penalties are payable to the U.S. Treasury and not to EPA. See 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 173 (2000) 
(penalties under the CWA are payable to the U.S. Treasury). 
Most federal environmental statutes include civil penalties imposing a range of maxi-
mum penalties. See, e.g., Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties for Inflation, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 19.1–.4 (2007). In 2004, EPA adopted its Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties for In-
flation rule to adjust EPA’s civil monetary penalties for inflation. See id. (increasing the per-
day penalties for violation of the CWA to $32,500 and $6500 for minor stationary source 
field citation violations, the CAA to $32,500 with a maximum of $270,000, the SDWA to 
$32,500, and EPCRA to $97,500 for subsequent violations). 
15 Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Envi-
ronmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 401, 415 (2004) 
(estimating that ninety percent of EPA enforcement and ninety-five percent of state en-
forcement is administrative). 
16 2006 Numbers at a Glance, supra note 14. EPA’s enforcement data reports, how-
ever, have been seriously disputed by outside organizations that claim EPA’s data has been 
exaggerated to hide a significant reduction in enforcement results. See Envtl. Integrity 
Project, Paying Less to Pollute: Environmental Enforcement Under the Bush 
Administration 2 (2007), available at http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/pubs/Pay- 
ing%20Less%20to%20Pollute.pdf (noting that Justice Department cases were down sev-
enty percent, civil penalties declined by twenty-four percent, and criminal fines were down 
thirty-eight percent comparing 1996 to 2000 with 2002 to 2006). More specifically, the 
Environmental Integrity Project (EIP) claims that for 2006 the number of administrative 
penalty settlements was actually 2056 and that the much larger EPA-reported figure was 
due to large numbers of “amnesty agreements” with large animal feeding operations that 
included nominal $500 civil penalties. See id. at 6, 10 app.I; Claudia Copeland, CRS Re-
port for Congress, Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture: EPA’s Air Compli-
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numbers into a comparative perspective, during this same year, EPA 
reported that the total number of judicial enforcement cases con-
cluded in federal court totaled only 173 and that $82 million were col-
lected in civil penalties.17 A private estimate places the number of civil 
enforcement law suits filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in fiscal 
year 2006 to be only fifteen cases.18 The overall trends in EPA enforce-
ment demonstrate consistent reductions in the number of judicial civil 
case referrals and case conclusions, as well as criminal sentences and 
fines.19 While at the same time, the available data shows that EPA ad-
                                                                                                                      
ance Agreement 2 (2006), available at http://www.ncifap.org/_images/CRS_Air_Quality_ 
and_Animal_Ag_Oct_2006.pdf. 
17 2006 Numbers at a Glance, supra note 14. Perhaps reflecting the seriousness of ju-
dicially resolved enforcement actions, the fiscal year 2006 total of judicially imposed civil 
penalties stood at $82 million, or nearly double the amount generated by the administra-
tive system. Id. This number is also disputed by the EIP as being inflated due to the inclu-
sion of a $40 million—and possibly uncollectible—default judgment gained against one 
large polluter who did not defend an enforcement case. Envtl. Integrity Project, supra 
note 16, at 1–3. The EIP’s analysis of fiscal year 2006 penalty data agreed with EPA’s total of 
$42 million for administrative penalties. Id. at 10 app.I. They disagreed, however, with the 
EPA’s claim that it had collected a total of $124 million for both judicial and administrative 
cases. Id.; 2006 Numbers at a Glance, supra note 14. The EIP found only $49 million in 
judicial civil penalties for a total of just $91 million. Envtl. Integrity Project, supra note 
16, at 10 app.I. 
18 Envtl. Integrity Project, supra note 16, at 10 app.I. As low as this number may 
seem, it actually is higher than the 2002 to 2006 average of fourteen. See id. The EIP, a 
Washington, D.C. EPA watchdog group headed by the former EPA enforcement chief, 
derived this information from a Freedom of Information Act request and examination of 
EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History online database. Id. at 7. 
19 See Environmental Enforcement, supra note 8, at 112. Taking an annual average 
from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2006 from EPA-reported enforcement statistics, the fol-
lowing patterns of EPA enforcement performance emerge, with fiscal year 2006 being 
close to or under the five year averages: 
1) Civil judicial referrals average 266 per year as compared to 286 in fiscal year 2006. 
2) Civil judicial case conclusions average 183 per year as compared to 173 in fiscal year 2006. 
3) Criminal sentences imposed average 155 years as compared to 154 years in fiscal year 2006. 
4) Criminal fines imposed average $64.6 million per year as compared to $43 million in 
fiscal year 2006. 
Comparisons to the prior five year period, fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2001, tell a differ-
ent story: 
1) Civil judicial referrals average 346 per year. 
2) Civil judicial case conclusions have no data available. 
3) Criminal sentences imposed 187 years. 
4) Criminal fines imposed average $255.4 million. 
This reduction in judicially imposed enforcement penalties has led several commentators 
to opine that the EPA enforcement system has become ineffective. See Environmental 
Enforcement, supra note 8, at 112; William L. Andreen, Motivating Enforcement: Institu-
tional Culture and the Clean Water Act, 24 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 67, 76 (2007). Some have 
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ministrative penalties have become the only increasing form of en-
forcement undertaken over the last decade.20 This striking rise in in-
house environmental enforcement has occurred just when more visible 
judicial enforcement has diminished. 
 Administrative enforcement has not only become the more fre-
quently selected alternative to judicial enforcement, but it has also 
given rise to the development of an administrative analogue to the fed-
eral judicial system—an administrative judicial system.21 This system 
conducts adjudicatory proceedings governed by its own Agency rules of 
practice, largely within the confines of EPA, in an insulated administra-
tive format with significantly less public involvement or awareness.22 
Despite the increasing importance of EPA’s internal enforcement re-
gime, the workings of this administrative enforcement process have op-
erated as a stealth system, largely escaping the view of the public. Over 
the years, it has also avoided scholarly examination both in terms of its 
methods and its results.23 Significantly, there has been no concerted 
                                                                                                                      
been charitable in their comments, stating that “the volume of civil enforcement has fluc-
tuated over time, in part due to resource constraints, and in part due to the philosophical 
leanings of various administrations.” See Environmental Enforcement, supra note 8, at 
112. Worse, this drop has led some critics to suggest that: 
 Breakdowns in federal enforcement seriously undercut law enforcement 
efforts, produce confusion in the regulated community, encourage non-
compliance, and subject the EPA to ridicule. Such lapses also breach an im-
plied social contract with those regulated entities who, relying upon responsi-
ble enforcement, have invested substantial amounts of time and money to 
comply with the law. 
Andreen, supra, at 76 (footnote omitted); see also John Solomon & Juliet Eilperin, Bush’s 
EPA Is Pursuing Fewer Polluters, Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 2007, at A1 (noting a seventy percent 
drop in civil lawsuits to enforce environmental law pursued between 2002 and 2006, rela-
tive to the late 1990s). 
20 Envtl. Integrity Project, supra note 16, at 10 app.I. This EIP data indicates more 
than a doubling in EPA administrative penalty settlements from 1004 in 1996 to 2056 in 
2006. Id. There is no data in this report indicating the proportion of administrative penal-
ties imposed as the result of a contested case in the EPA administrative system. These fig-
ures also demonstrate a fairly stable total of administrative civil penalties collected, at ap-
proximately $30 million per year, with 2006 reaching a higher total of $42 million. Id. 
21 See Environmental Enforcement, supra note 8, at 94. 
22 See id. 
23 A cursory description of this administrative enforcement system is usually within 
most environmental texts and treatises. See Joseph J. Lisa, EPA Administrative Enforcement 
Actions: An Introduction to the Consolidated Rules of Practice, 24 Temp. J. Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 
1, 3–4 (2005) (providing a description of EPA’s existing Part 22 Rules of Practice); Richard 
R. Wagner, The U.S. EPA Administrator’s Assessment of Civil Penalties: A Review of the Sources of 
Authority and the Administrator’s Regulations, 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 149, 
156–57 (1997) (providing a brief description of pre-1999 Part 22 procedure and author-
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attempt to analyze reported case decisions that have been generated by 
these administrative enforcement methods. The augmented use of 
EPA’s administrative civil penalty technique of enforcing environmental 
rules is the focus of this Article. 
 Part I will provide an overview of EPA’s environmental enforce-
ment activities with a description of the changing mix of enforcement 
tools over the last decade.24 Part II will describe EPA’s practice of ad-
ministrative enforcement, concentrating on the methods that are em-
ployed that may result in the imposition of administrative penalties.25 
Part III will examine the empirical data of reported administrative en-
forcement actions taken under five environmental statutes over a five-
year period to analyze EPA Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions 
on the design of civil penalties assessed under the Agency’s civil penalty 
policies and governing environmental statutes.26 Lastly, Part IV will pro-
vide conclusions about the wisdom and efficacy of such an administra-
tive system imposition of civil penalties.27 
I. EPA’s Enforcement Authorities and Practices 
A. How Environmental Statutes Achieve Their Purposes 
 Federal environmental law has no single, uniform statutory base. 
Over the last four decades, Congress has enacted numerous pieces of 
legislation focusing upon a range of particular types of environmental 
problems. For example, the CAA was concerned with the nation’s air 
quality while the CWA focused upon the eradication of pollution in the 
nation’s waters.28 As a result, federal environmental law has been estab-
lished in a media-specific or problem-specific fashion and, as a conse-
quence, is a composite of a large number of statutes. These environ-
mental laws usually direct EPA to set substantive and procedural 
requirements necessary for the achievement of identified environ-
mental policy goals underlying each statute.29 For instance, in order to 
                                                                                                                      
ity). The best summary of administrative enforcement practices can be found in 2 Law of 
Environmental Protection § 9:5–:12 (Novick et al. eds., 2007). 
24 See infra Part I. 
25 See infra Part II. 
26 See infra Part III. 
27 See infra Part IV. 
28 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000 & Supp. 2004); Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
29 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (requiring EPA to “prepare or develop comprehensive 
programs” for reducing water pollution under the CWA). 
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meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) set under 
the CAA, EPA and the states must establish source-specific emission 
standards that limit the amount of air pollution that can be emitted.30 
Agency requirements, such as these emission rules, often impose eco-
nomic costs, require operational changes and/or delay activities falling 
under EPA’s statutory jurisdiction.31 As a result, these environmental 
standards may not be enthusiastically embraced by those subject to 
them. Not surprisingly, those falling under the EPA regulatory umbrella 
may find many practical reasons not to comply or not to fully comply 
with these rules. 
 As with any regulatory scheme, EPA must find ways to have its 
regulations followed so that the environmentally protective goals of the 
regulations and statutes will be realized. But how will compliance be 
achieved? What approach will be taken? This effort to insure regulatory 
compliance is generally known as enforcement.32 Two main theories of 
enforcement have been advocated: a deterrence-based approach and a 
negotiated, cooperative approach.33 Over time, and with the differing 
political philosophies of successive governing administrations, the rela-
tive emphasis between these two approaches can shift. Despite this ob-
servation, EPA’s enforcement system has consistently stressed deter-
rence-based enforcement methods using formal sanctions imposed 
through adversarial processes as a sign of programmatic success.34 The 
central idea underlying this view is that polluters will act in an eco-
nomically rational fashion and will seek to avoid the certain—and 
                                                                                                                      
30 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (stating that CAA implementation plans must in-
clude “enforceable emission limitations and other control measures, means, or techniques 
. . . as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the applicable requirements of this chapter”). 
31 See, e.g., id. § 7410(a)(2)(F). New performance standards necessary to meet envi-
ronmental quality goals often require that firms construct new facilities or modify existing 
ones in order to meet the standards. See id. Examples of this principle are legion in the 
EPA environmental regulations. See, e.g., id. 
32 Office of Enforcement, EPA, Principles of Environmental Enforcement 1-2 
(1992), available at http://www.tinyurl.com/ytdj71 (defining enforcement as a “set of actions 
that governments or others take to achieve compliance within the regulated community”). 
33 Raymond J. Burby, Coercive Versus Cooperative Pollution Control: Comparative Study of 
State Programs to Reduce Erosion and Sedimentation Pollution in Urban Areas, 19 Envtl. Mgmt. 
359, 359–61 (1995). 
34 See Joel A. Mintz, Enforcement at the EPA: High Stakes and Hard Choices 
102 (1995) (“With the brief exception . . . of the early 1980s, both the EPA’s written en-
forcement policies and its actual practices have consistently emphasized the initiation of 
formal enforcement actions against violators of federal environmental standards.”). EPA 
reports its annual enforcement accomplishments on its website and promotes its regula-
tory achievements whenever it can. 2006 Numbers at a Glance, supra note 14. 
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high—penalty costs of their environmentally noncompliant conduct.35 
This risk avoidance will influence behavior and encourage compli-
ance.36 In this way of thinking, EPA consistently must act to quickly 
identify regulatory violations and punish these transgressions in a pre-
dictable and economically onerous way. Even if EPA wishes to employ 
its enforcement powers in a more conciliatory or cooperative way, it 
must maintain the possibility of using more punitive tactics as an incen-
tive to securing cooperation.37 This conclusion is especially true when 
public health and environmental quality interests are at stake. In the 
most environmentally threatening situations, the deterrence theory 
also requires that EPA have the authority to punish particularly egre-
gious behavior with noneconomic criminal law penalties.38 
B. The Means of Assuring Compliance: The Statutory Design of 
Environmental Enforcement 
 When designing the structure of federal environmental statutes, 
Congress considered enforcement to be an important component of its 
statutory policy. It did not establish a single enforcement method to 
                                                                                                                      
35 Colin S. Diver, A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 28 Pub. Pol’y 257, 263 (1980) (not-
ing that costs can include reputational injury, legal expenses, closer future regulatory over-
sight, and tort liability). 
36 Id. 
37 See id. 
38 Id. Criminal sanctions exist within the enforcement provisions of environmental law. 
See Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, § 202(a), 104 Stat. 2954, 2962 
(1990). According to EPA’s fiscal year 2006 Compliance and Enforcement data, for the five 
year period ending in fiscal year 2006, approximately 300 defendants were charged with 
criminal offenses annually. See 2006 Numbers at a Glance, supra note 14. Within EPA is 
the Criminal Investigative Division that is required to be staffed with a minimum of 200 
investigators. See Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990 § 202(a). “The EPA now employs 172 
investigators in its Criminal Investigation Division, below the minimum of 200 agents re-
quired by the 1990 Pollution Prosecution Act, signed by President George H.W. Bush.” 
Solomon & Eilperin, supra note 19, at A1. 
These investigators often work in tandem with those of other federal agencies, such as 
the Coast Guard and the Department of Transportation, to ferret out information that 
would lead to a criminal referral to the Department of Justice (DOJ). See id. A 1994 EPA 
guidance document instructs these investigators to concentrate on environmental viola-
tions that cause “significant environmental harm.” Memorandum from Earl E. Deveney, 
Director, Office of Criminal Enforcement, EPA to All EPA Employees Working in or in 
Support of the Criminal Enforcement Program 3 ( Jan. 12, 1994), available at http://www. 
epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/criminal/exercise.pdf. If this harm occurs in con-
junction with “culpable conduct” such as “repeat violations, deliberate misconduct, efforts 
to conceal,” or tampering with pollution monitors, then criminal prosecution is recom-
mended. Steven P. Solow, Preventing an Environmental Violation from Becoming a Criminal 
Case, Nat. Resources & Env’t., Spring 2004, at 19, 20. 
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enforce the new environmental laws. With each statute enacted, Con-
gress created a diverse array of overlapping enforcement tools. Each 
individual environmental statute allowed for the imposition of a range 
of both civil and criminal sanctions against noncompliant behavior.39 
But that was not all. Concerned that rules might not be rigorously im-
plemented by the government, Congress embraced a policy of diffusing 
environmental enforcement authority by granting it to both govern-
mental and nongovernmental actors.40 In most instances, federal envi-
ronmental law vests enforcement authority in state and federal gov-
ernments as well as providing enforcement power to individuals and 
citizen groups.41 By expanding the range of enforcement authority, 
Congress intended to maximize the chances of achieving the important 
environmental objectives it had established.42 
 The structure of this system of environmental enforcement has 
been described as a four-tier hierarchical structure.43 Tier one is com-
prised of enforcement actions taken by state, local, and tribal govern-
ments, as well as citizens organizations in state or federal court or ad-
ministrative agencies. State environmental agencies and attorney 
general offices initiate the largest number of actions overall, and their 
work implements both federal and state environmental law.44 Tier two 
                                                                                                                      
39 See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2) (2000) (listing sanctions 
under the CWA). 
40 See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 108, 
108 (2005). Congressional intent in designing such a redundant enforcement scheme was 
intended to provide for checks and balances in environmental enforcement so as to mini-
mize the chances of “regulatory underkill.” Id. 
41 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B). A number of the major federal pollution control 
statutes actually use a cooperative federalism approach to the achievement of their statutory 
purposes. See, e.g., id. Cooperative federalism in the environmental context has been described 
in the following terms: “This arrangement—in which Congress gives EPA ultimate responsibil-
ity for program delivery but requires or authorizes EPA to vest primary responsibility with 
states for program implementation—is often referred to as a ‘cooperative federalism’ ap-
proach to environmental regulation.” Clifford Rechtschaffen & David L. Markell, Rein-
venting Environmental Enforcement & the State/Federal Relationship 15–16 (2003); 
see Robert V. Percival, Environmental Regulation 120–21 (3d ed. 2000). 
42 See John C. Cruden & Bruce S. Gelber, Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement: Process, 
Actors, and Trends, 18 Nat. Resources & Env’t. 10, 10 (2004). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 11; see 2 Daniel P. Selmi & Kenneth A. Manaster, State Environmental 
Law § 16:9–:18 (2006) (describing state administrative enforcement). Rather than sup-
plementing federal environmental enforcement with vigorous actions, state enforcement 
has declined in terms of the numbers of actions. See James R. May, Now More Than Ever: 
Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 Widener L. Rev. 1, 31 (2003) (documenting a 
more than forty percent decline in state administrative enforcement between 1998 and 
2002). Administrative enforcement power is not uniformly distributed, and some states, 
including Michigan and Wisconsin, lack the authority completely. See Sue Ellen Keiner et 
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is composed of “federal administrative agency actions.”45 This highly 
visible form of judicial enforcement is brought by the DOJ upon refer-
ral from EPA or another federal agency and is usually reserved for 
more serious or complex enforcement matters.46 Tier three is com-
prised of federal criminal enforcement of environmental law, also 
brought upon referral to the DOJ and prosecuted by the United States 
in U.S. district court.47 This form of enforcement penalty is reserved for 
some of the most egregious conduct threatening environmental quality 
and human health.48 Tier four contains federal administrative agency 
actions taken to enforce environmental law.49 Administrative enforce-
ment occurs in a number of formal and informal forms, including the 
issuance of notices of violation, compliance orders, abatement orders, 
and penalty assessment orders.50 It is the last of these administrative 
enforcement actions—penalty assessment orders—that constitutes the 
focus of this Article.51 These financial penalties frequently are brought 
                                                                                                                      
al., Beyond Enforcement? Environment, Compliance Assistance and Corporate 
Leadership in Five Midwestern States 4-7-50 (2003); see also David L. Markell, The Role 
of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between 
Theory and Reality, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 43 (2000) (outlining shortcomings in state 
environmental enforcement). 
45 Cruden & Gelber, supra note 42, at 10. 
46 See id. at 12. 
47 See id.; see, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000); Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2000); Clean Air Act; 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2000); Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601–9675, § 9603(b) (2000). 
48 Cruden & Gelber, supra note 42, at 10. Two CWA cases provide examples of the ad-
verse health effects of water polluting discharges that led to criminal indictments. See 
United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 650 (2d Cir. 1993) (throwing hepatitis 
B tainted blood samples into a river found not within the CWA); United States v. Weitzen-
hoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993) (dumping of waste-activated sludge into the Pacific 
Ocean was a knowing violation of the CWA). 
49 Cruden & Gelber, supra note 42, at 10. 
50 Id. While EPA is accorded principal enforcement authority under most environ-
mental laws, other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast 
Guard, the Department of Interior, and the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, possess important environmental enforcement functions as well. Id. This Article will 
examine the administrative penalty practice only of the EPA. 
51 Environmental Enforcement, supra note 8, at 83. EPA’s authority to administra-
tively impose civil penalties did not exist when the federal environmental statutes were first 
enacted. Id. As Professor Joel Mintz has noted: 
 At the federal level, the first set of modern environmental legislation in the 
early 1970s granted EPA only the authority to issue administrative orders that 
directed recipients to comply with particular conditions and requirements. At 
that time, EPA lacked the authority to issue orders directly assessing penalties. 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, however, in an attempt to provide EPA with addi-
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under the authority of a wide range of federal environment statutes, 
and they are the result of settlement agreements and administrative 
case decisions.52 
 This four-tier array of enforcement methods represents a mix of 
techniques sharing the common goal of ensuring compliance with the 
myriad environmental rules and regulations, as well as the larger pro-
grammatic objectives underlying each environmental statute.53 While 
citizen suits continue to be filed, the vast majority of environmental en-
forcement activity is initiated by the government, rather than by citizens 
or environmental organizations.54 Frequently, media attention is fixed 
upon enforcement results from significant court judgments or settle-
                                                                                                                      
tional enforcement tools, Congress amended several important environmental 
laws to empower EPA to assess penalties through administrative action. 
Id. 
52 See id. In fact, in fiscal year 2006, financial civil penalties were imposed administra-
tively in over 2650 instances. 2006 Numbers at a Glance, supra note 14. While the agency 
incentives for using the administrative—non-judicial—methods of enforcement are strong, 
some commentators have warned of their excessive use. See, e.g., Law of Environmental 
Protection, supra note 23, at § 9:9. It has been noted that: 
Over-reliance on administrative orders to the exclusion of more drastic 
remedies, however, softens the fiber of the regulatory program and results in 
the erosion of its credibility. This ultimately leads to the all too familiar pat-
tern of a succession of orders endlessly amending and extending earlier or-
ders. Indeed, the effectiveness of administrative orders depends upon the 
perception by the regulated community that the government will not hesitate 
to use more drastic remedies if the order is violated. Administrative orders are 
not self-enforcing and EPA has no contempt powers. Administrative orders 
can only be enforced by a court. 
Id. 
53 See Cruden & Gelber, supra note 42, at 10. 
54 See May, supra note 44, at 25. One study noted that 38.5% fewer citizen suits were initi-
ated under the CWA and the CAA in 2002 than in 1996. Id.; see Andreen, supra note 19, at 76. 
Even with this reduction, citizen suits under these two statutes contributed approximately 
twenty-seven percent of the number of EPA civil referrals to the DOJ over a ten year period. 
Id. Enforcement of environmental standards by individuals and organizations is allowed un-
der the citizen suit provisions contained in most federal environmental laws. These provi-
sions allow federal courts to issue injunctive remedies and to impose civil penalties. See, e.g., 
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2000); Emer-
gency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001–11,005, 
11,021–11,023, 11, 041–11,050, 11,046(f) (2000). Evidence suggests that at least sixty-eight 
environmental law citizen suits were filed per year in the period from 1970 to 2003. See May, 
supra note 44, at 2–4 (finding that more than 2000 citizen suits were filed between 1970 and 
2003). Considering the fact that in fiscal year 2006, EPA referred 286 civil enforcement cases 
to DOJ, and that there were 173 civil case conclusions, citizen suits represent a small fraction 
of the total of litigated environmental enforcement cases. See 2006 Numbers at a Glance, 
supra note 14. But see May, supra note 44, at 3–4. 
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ments imposing substantial monetary penalties and far-reaching in-
junctive relief.55 With this big case emphasis in the popular media and in 
the minds of many commentators, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that 
a significant amount of environmental enforcement occurs within EPA 
itself by way of administrative or agency penalty practice.56 It is not dif-
ficult to comprehend the reasons for this shift towards administrative 
enforcement: (1) reduced agency resources than are required by judi-
cial methods; (2) EPA independence in enforcement without required 
coordination with the DOJ; and (3) decisionmaking by EPA’s ALJs, who 
are familiar with the law, regulations, and technical aspects of environ-
mental conflicts.57 Relying upon these administrative authorities, EPA 
annually obtains both monetary penalties and injunctive relief in many 
individual cases that are decided within its own administrative judicial 
system staffed by EPA ALJs and by EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board 
(EAB or Board).58 As the statistical data below will indicate, this kind of 
                                                                                                                      
55 Press Release, EPA, EPA Reaches $100 Million Agreement in Olympic–Shell Pipeline 
Case (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/4a3d7e51caf 
96c7a85257359003f533e/ea057914f8e03450852570cb0075e23a!OpenDocument. Examples 
of large penalties can be found in public announcements by EPA. See id. For instance, the 
Agency gave notice that it had reached a settlement against Olympia Pipeline and Shell 
Pipeline companies for a total of $100 million in improvements and penalties. Id. Of this 
amount, $36 million was composed of civil and criminal penalties. See id.; see also Lee Han-
cock & Matt Stiles, Foundry Admits Air Violations: Tyler Pipe to Pay $4.5 Million Fine, Gets 5 
Years’ Probation, Dallas Morning News, Mar. 23, 2005, at 5A, available at 2005 WLNR 
24705219 (discussing criminal penalties under the CAA). Some studies, however, have 
indicated a significant decline in EPA financial penalties, including civil penalties—a 
twenty-five percent reduction—and criminal fines—a thirty-eight percent drop—in fiscal 
years 2002 through 2006 as compared to fiscal years 1996 through 2000. See Press Release, 
Envtl. Integrity Project, Pollution Enforcement Efforts Under the Bush Administration’s 
EPA Drop on Four of Five Key Fronts (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.environmen- 
talintegrity.org/pubs/052307%20EIP%20EPA%20enforcement%20data%20news%20release 
%20FINAL3.pdf. 
56 See Andreen, supra note 19, at 74. In fact, during the period from 1997 through 
2005, a substantial decline—thirty-seven percent to forty-one percent—in EPA’s civil refer-
rals to the DOJ for judicial enforcement was offset by a steady and significant increase in 
EPA’s administrative enforcement orders. Id. There have been studies documenting sub-
stantial declines in EPA’s enforcement efforts for several years. See Seth Borenstein, Fewer 
Polluters Punished Under Bush, Data Show, Houston Cronicle, Dec. 9, 2003, at A2, available 
at 2003 WLNR 16429053 (examining seventeen categories of civil enforcement and find-
ing reduced annual averages below both the first Bush and the Clinton administrations). 
57 Environmental Enforcement, supra note 8, at 79. 
58 The structure of EPA’s administrative enforcement can be discerned from EPA’s 
rules of practice. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.1–.52; Law of Environmental Protection, supra 
note 23, at § 9:5–:12; Lisa, supra note 23, at 3–4. This system of agency adjudication con-
tains both a trial level (ALJs) and an appellate level (EAB). See Lisa, supra note 23, at 8–9. 
Both function within an established and regulated system replete with practice manuals. 
See Helene Ambrosino, Handbook on Administrative Enforcement at EPA (3d ed. 2002). The 
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administrative enforcement is becoming increasingly common as more 
cases are disposed of in this low visibility, administrative fashion. The 
wisdom of this enhanced reliance on civil enforcement via administra-
tive means remains an open question. 
II. The EPA Administrative Enforcement Process 
A. Determining Environmental Compliance 
 As the annual enforcement statistics indicate, the administrative 
enforcement of environmental statutes has “play[ed] an ever-increasing 
role in the EPA’s enforcement activities.”59 However, in order to fully 
comprehend the data reported in this Article, it is necessary to briefly 
describe the administrative process emphasizing its structure, deci-
sionmaking methods, and enforcement results.60 Enforcement of envi-
ronmental law also depends upon EPA’s awareness of compliant or 
noncompliant behavior, followed by steps taken to assure that rules will 
be followed.61 The mere existence of EPA environmental rules without 
the assurance that they are being observed would represent an empty 
effort. Obvious questions arise. Does the regulated firm have a neces-
sary permit and is it meeting its performance obligations required un-
                                                                                                                      
EAB decisions constitute final agency action, and, as the “consummation of the agency’s 
decision-making process,” they are determinative within this EPA structure. Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 
333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)). As final agency action, they may be appealed to a federal court. 
See id. at 177. They cannot be further appealed to the EPA Administrator. See id. Once the 
EAB’s decisions reach federal court, they will be reviewed to determine whether they are 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” 
under § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551--559, 701--706, 
1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5362, 7521, 706(2)(A) (2000). Functioning as an internal 
appellate body within EPA’s administrative judicial system, the EAB has issued its own Prac-
tice Manual to assist parties in the adjudicatory process. See Lisa, supra note 23, at 9. 
59 Lisa, supra note 23, at 2. 
60 See generally Ambrosino, supra note 58 (describing in detail EPA structure and pro-
cedure). Much of the information concerning EPA administrative enforcement procedure 
is derived from conversations with Ms. Joyce Howell, Esq., Senior General Counsel, Region 
III, EPA in March and April 2006, Mr. Michael Walker, Esq. Enforcement Office in Wash-
ington, D.C. in April 2006, and other enforcement counsel. Telephone Interviews with 
Joyce Howell, Senior Gen. Counsel, Region III, EPA (Mar. & Apr. 2006) (on file with au-
thor); Telephone Interview with Michael Walker, Senior Enforcement Counsel, Office of 
Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA ( Jan. 2008) (on file with author). 
61 See Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Interdisciplinary Aspects of Environmental Enforce-
ment, 36 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,495 ( July 2006) (describing the four sources of 
critical environmental enforcement information). At the heart of EPA’s enforcement efforts 
rests the availability of accurate compliance information which enables the agency to assess 
its success in achieving regulatory goals. Id. 
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der the regulatory program? Having clear and reliable answers to these 
questions is fundamental to the enforcement process and, ultimately, to 
the achievement of the underlying environmental program objectives.62 
 In order to determine compliance status, the Agency must acquire 
information concerning compliance—is the firm or individual meeting 
the environmental rules or violating them? Violations are identified 
through reports generated by EPA’s program-specific inspectors who 
visit and inspect regulated sites on a periodic basis. These inspectors 
perform their duties pursuant to EPA’s inspection guidelines. Often, 
they have deep experience and expertise with a number of environ-
mental statutes, allowing them to identify violations on-site. The gather-
ing of this compliance information stands at the center of the enforce-
ment process and is crucial to the success of environmental regulation. 
B. Deciding Whether to Enforce 
 When an inspection identifies a compliance issue of concern to 
the Agency, the inspector distributes his report to the pertinent pro-
gram manager for review. The program manager and staff then deter-
mine whether the submitted inspection report has described an in-
stance of significant noncompliance requiring an enforcement 
response. This program manager will also conduct “tier meetings” with 
both the state in which the facility is located and EPA staff. The state 
tier meeting will determine whether EPA or the state will initiate the 
enforcement action. Perhaps due to resource constraints, states fre-
quently defer to EPA and elect to have it proceed with enforcing the 
violation.63 EPA may also prefer to take charge of the matter to ensure 
that a state-led enforcement action will not result in a settlement that 
                                                                                                                      
62 EPA obtains enforcement information from a variety of sources, including facility 
self-reporting, governmental inspections, and investigations. EPA conducted approxi-
mately 23,000 inspections in 2006. Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, 
EPA, FY 2006 OECA Accomplishments Report 27 (2006), available at http://www.epa. 
gov/compliance/resources/reports/accomplishments/oeca/fy06accomplishment.pdf. This 
figure represents a significant increase from fiscal years 2001 and 2002, where the number 
of EPA inspections was approximately 17,500 per year. Id. 
63 It is notable, however, that the states collectively initiate far more environmental en-
forcement actions than does EPA. EPA’s enforcement statistics reveal the disparity between 
state and federal enforcement activities. EPA records indicate that the percentage of state-led 
actions is often over ninety percent. Sector Notebooks Data Refresh, Compliance Assistance, 
US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/assistance/sectors/note- 
books/data_refresh.html (follow “Five--Year Summary” hyperlink under “Enforcement and 
Compliance Summary for Selected Industries”) (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). 
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imposes lenient financial penalties and operating permit features.64 As 
a procedural matter, EPA cannot proceed within its own administrative 
enforcement system with the state as a co-plaintiff. If the state insisted 
in joining in the enforcement proceeding, EPA would have to proceed 
with a judicial enforcement action. 
C. Initiating the Administrative Enforcement Process: EPA’s Complaint 
 If EPA and the state conclude that EPA alone will proceed with 
enforcement, an internal EPA tier meeting of EPA’s General Counsel 
and relevant Agency program heads will result in the appointment of a 
staff attorney to review the inspection report and to make a recom-
mendation on whether to proceed and how. If violations have been 
identified, a notice of violation will be issued to the actor, informing it 
of the regulatory infraction and requesting compliance with the envi-
ronmental rules.65 Ultimately, the General Counsel and program heads 
then make the final decision on whether to proceed with the matter 
and what form of relief should be sought. If the decision is to proceed, 
the previously appointed staff attorney will review the case file and draft 
an administrative complaint.66 The complaint is then reviewed using 
the same concurrence process involving the General Counsel and the 
program heads before it is filed. 
 In most instances, the complaint will make a claim for a specific 
dollar amount to be assessed as a civil penalty. Approximately ten per-
                                                                                                                      
64 An example of this phenomena can be found in the well-known CWA citizen suit 
case. See generally Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 
1542 (E.D. Va. 1985) (finding the citizen group had standing and authorizing the group to 
seek a civil penalty against the polluter). The federal district court found for the environ-
mental plaintiffs and imposed a civil penalty of $1.28 million upon the defendant. Id. at 
1565. Judge Merhige reduced the maximum penalty of $6.6 million after considering ad-
justment factors. Id. at 1556. However, the Commonwealth of Virginia had recovered pen-
alties of merely $40,000 for the same violations in a case brought in state court for viola-
tions of state law. See Ann Powers, Gwaltney of Smithfield Revisited, 23 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. 
& Pol’y Rev. 557, 562–63 & n.32 (1999). 
65 Even prior to the filing of EPA’s administrative complaint, EPA may engage in nego-
tiation by sending a “show cause” letter to the alleged violator setting out the agency’s alle-
gation and specifying a civil penalty. Telephone Interview with Michael Walker, Senior 
Enforcement Counsel, Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA ( Jan. 2008) 
(on file with author). 
66 The complaint must contain statutory authorization supporting a factual basis for 
relief sought, including penalty assessed, or, when no penalty is yet assessed, a description 
of the severity of the violations alleged; request for Permit Action, compliance or correc-
tive action; notice of right to a hearing; address; instructions for paying penalties; and a 
copy of the Consolidated Rules of Practice. 40 C.F.R § 22.14(a)(1)–(8) (2007). The com-
plaint can also be amended or withdrawn. Id. § 22.14(c)–(d). 
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cent of the time, however, complaints will state no specific penalty 
amount but will make a general penalty demand by setting forth the 
number of alleged violations and their severity.67 In the remaining 
ninety percent of cases, a penalty request is structured from penalty 
policies and penalty matrices based on statutory factors and EPA civil 
penalty guidance.68 It is important to note that the penalty calculation 
usually begins with the program personnel and not the enforcement 
attorney. In theory, if the consideration of the statutory and administra-
tive penalty policies occurs at this early stage in the enforcement proc-
ess, it will effectively establish the EPA’s civil penalty request at a high 
point that will frequently be compromised in a settlement agreement 
or an ALJ case decision. 
 Although at this point there has not yet been any contact with the 
opposing party, once the complaint is filed, the opposing party is in-
vited to participate in settlement discussions prior to filing its answer.69 
Only rarely does the opposing party simply choose to pay the penalty 
sought in the complaint and thereby end the enforcement action. The 
settlement negotiations are conducted at the regional-office level by 
regional personnel. In most cases, parties charged in administrative 
complaints elect to negotiate with EPA, hoping to reach a prehearing 
settlement. Settlement options available to the opposing party will vary 
according to the allegations that have been made in the complaint, but 
usually the respondent and EPA discuss: (1) modifications to payment 
obligations; (2) whether or not to file an answer; (3) questions about 
underlying liability; (4) agreements on extension motions; (5) setting 
future settlement meetings; and, most importantly, (6) timetables for 
compliance if the alleged violation has not yet been corrected. 
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. § 22.14(a)(4)(ii). 
68 Lisa, supra note 23, at 13–14. (“When the complainant elects to make a specific penalty 
demand, it has been the practice of the Agency to calculate such civil penalties based upon 
the previously mentioned statutory factors and in accordance with civil penalty policies cre-
ated by EPA.”); see Policies & Guidance, Civil Enforcement, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/resources/policies/civil/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2008) (providing links 
to various examples of EPA penalty policies); see, e.g., Office of Enforcement & Compli-
ance Assurance, EPA, Civil Penalty Policy for Section 311(b)(3) and Section 311(j) 
of the Clean Water Act 1 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/ 
policies/civil/cwa/311pen.pdf. 
69 See 40 C.F.R. § 22.18(b)–(c); see also Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the 
Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties Issuance of Compliance or Corrective Action 
Order and the Revocation, Termination, or Suspension of Permits, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 
40,157 ( July 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22) (discussing proposed rules to the 
settlement process). 
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 Frequently, negotiated settlements include features that are not 
exclusively civil fines, but rather, agreements to take other environmen-
tally beneficial actions in order to mitigate the cash penalties initially 
assessed. These settlement tools are called Supplemental Environ-
mental Projects (SEPs) and, if undertaken by the respondent, could 
result in a reduction of the initial penalty assessment.70 The range of 
potential SEPs is quite broad. For example, for an Emergency Planning 
and Citizen Right-to-Know Act violation, the opposing party could offer 
to utilize substitute chemicals in its processes that are not statutorily 
within the jurisdiction of EPA.71 SEPs could also include easements for 
open space and accompanying land trust conveyances for RCRA viola-
tions,72 or purchasing hybrid busses for significant CAA violations.73 
SEPs are commonly used as components of EPA settlements and are 
subject to Agency policy.74 While EPA cannot specifically propose that a 
company implement a SEP, nor propose what SEP might be acceptable, 
EPA can direct the party to a “SEP Idea Bank” for ideas.75 
                                                                                                                      
70 Environmental Enforcement, supra note 8, at 150. EPA is now increasingly using 
the SEP device as a part of its settlements. Professor Mintz has noted that in fiscal year 2006, 
EPA settled 220 cases requiring defendants to implement SEPs. See id. In its policy on SEPs, 
EPA sets out categories of supplemental projects that may be undertaken. Memorandum 
from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Adm’r, EPA, to Reg’l Adm’rs 7–11 (Apr. 10, 1998). 
71 See id. at 9. 
72 See id. at 10–11. 
73 See id. at 9. 
74 See id. at 3–4. In fiscal year 2006, EPA reached settlements in 220 cases where it re-
quired defendant to undertake SEPs with a total value of approximately $78 million. 2006 
Numbers at a Glance, supra note 14. States have also adopted SEP policies and included 
SEPs in state-brokered settlements. See Pub. L. Research Inst., Univ. of Cal. Hastings 
Coll. of L., Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Fifty State Survey with Model 
Practices 1 (2006), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/plri/SEPsummary. 
pdf. The academic literature has shown mixed receptiveness to EPA’s use of SEPs. Compare 
David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits of Environmental Enforcement Reform: The Case of Supple-
mental Environmental Projects, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1181, 1184 (criticizing SEPs for their “un-
derdeterrence” potential), with Joel S. Hirschhorn, Pollution Prevention Comes of Age, 29 Ga. 
L. Rev. 325, 331–32 (1995) (approving of SEP practices). 
75 EPA’s website provides information on the Agency’s SEP policy, SEP characteristics, 
and categories of acceptable SEPs. See SEPs, Civil Enforcement, Compliance and Enforce-
ment, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/civil/seps/index.html (last visited Apr. 
14, 2008). The six jurisdictions in the mid-Atlantic Region III have established a SEP Idea 
Bank and Index. See SEP Idea Bank, Mid-Atlantic Enforcement, US EPA, http://www.epa. 
gov/Region3/enforcement/sepbank.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). SEPs can warrant a 
100% credit to the gravity component of a penalty, although generally the credits fall in 
the range of sixty to eighty percent of the penalty proposed. See Memorandum from Steven 
A. Herman, supra note 70, at 22. No SEP credit is available for any penalty based upon 
economic benefit. Id. at 12. 
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 If the parties reach an agreement, EPA will draft a Consent Agree-
ment/Final Order (CAFO).76 The CAFO will generally contain both an 
outline of the settlement and a separate “conditions” document attach-
ment.77 It becomes final when approved by the Regional Judicial Officer 
(RJO) or Regional Administrator in the EPA region, since the RJOs 
serve as “Presiding Officers” in a Part 22 proceeding until an answer is 
filed by a respondent and the case is forwarded to the Agency’s Office of 
Administrative Law Judges.78 With this agreement and receipt of pay-
ment of the penalty, the regional official issues a Final Order ending the 
enforcement case.79 Up to this point, the administrative enforcement 
proceeding has been conducted by EPA’s regional officials as a process 
of negotiation and prehearing settlement. If settlement is not possible, 
the filing of the respondent’s answer to EPA’s complaint starts the adju-
dicatory hearing process.80 
D. After the Complaint: Respondent’s Answer and Prehearing  
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 Although the parties may continue to negotiate, the administrative 
hearing process formally begins when the respondent files an answer to 
EPA’s administrative complaint.81 In practice, the answer generally mir-
rors EPA’s complaint paragraph-by-paragraph. EPA considers a re-
sponse of “lacks sufficient information,” however, as the functional 
equivalent of a denial.82 Once the answer is filed, EPA’s Office of Ad-
ministrative Law Judges obtains jurisdiction over the action.83 At the 
                                                                                                                      
76 Settlement: Consent Agreement, 40 C.F.R. § 22.18(b)(2) (2007). 
77 See id. A consent agreement specifies the terms and conditions of the settlement. Id. 
78 See id. § 22.4(b). 
79 See id. § 22.18(b)(2), (c). This process is not exclusively a regionally managed one. 
EPA’s Washington, D.C. headquarters enforcement office files some cases on its own ac-
cord. Telephone Interview with Michael Walker, Senior Enforcement Counsel, Office of 
Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA ( Jan. 2008). 
80 40 C.F.R. § 22.15. 
81 See id.; Answer to the Complaint, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,153 ( July 23, 1999) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22). Contents must admit, deny, or explain each allegation and 
include circumstances or arguments alleged to constitute grounds for defense or any pro-
posed relief. 40 C.F.R. § 22.15(b). 
82 40 C.F.R. § 22.15(b). 
83 Id. § 22.21. ALJs are employed by many federal agencies to perform the quasi-
judicial function of conducting adjudicatory hearings authorized by the Administrative 
Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2000). EPA has less than ten ALJs working at any time to 
do this work. There is no universal panel of federal ALJs and each agency has its own 
cadre. Other agencies, such as the Social Security Administration, employ several hundred 
ALJs for the conduct of various Social Security benefit programs. See Robin J. Arzt, Recom-
mendations for a New Independent Adjudication Agency to Make the Final Administrative Adjudica-
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outset, the parties will have an opportunity to participate in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) or ADR arbitration methods to resolve the 
dispute. There are two main forms of ADR available: (1) party-initiated 
ADR and (2) EPA ALJ mediation.84 The chief ALJ will offer the parties 
an opportunity to participate in ADR or ADR arbitration methods,85 
which are usually conducted by a retired ALJ or an ALJ who will not 
thereafter preside at the hearing should the ADR process fail to resolve 
the matter. ADR is offered automatically and respondents almost always 
accept the offer since doing so delays the forward momentum of the 
administrative case and removes the case from the active docket. The 
arbitration session usually is conducted by telephone and the ALJ arbi-
trator frequently will comment individually to the strength or weakness 
of the respective parties’ positions. If this arbitration is successful, the 
arbitrator will report this result to the head ALJ who subsequently will 
issue a letter to the parties instructing them that they have thirty days to 
file the CAFO that formally terminates the administrative charge. If 
they do so, the matter ends without further hearing and decision.86 
 If the ADR arbitration is not successful in resolving the contro-
versy, the matter proceeds on a fast track towards an administrative 
hearing. Within approximately six months of filing the complaint, EPA 
is required to undertake its prehearing information exchange.87 At the 
same time, an EPA ALJ is assigned to preside over the case.88 The in-
formation exchange, with certain exceptions, establishes the exclusive 
list of documents, exhibits, and witnesses that may be considered or 
                                                                                                                      
tions of Social Security Act Benefits Claims, 23 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judges 267, 275–92 
(2003) (providing a general bibliography on federal ALJ practice). 
84 Lisa, supra note 23, at 37–38. 
85 See Alternative Dispute Resolution, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,158 ( July 23, 1999) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22). In 2000, EPA issued a final Policy on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution that encouraged ADR use in adjudications, rulemaking, policy development, 
and administrative and civil judicial enforcement actions. See Policy on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,858, 81,858–81,860 (Dec. 27, 2000). 
86 Lisa, supra note 23, at 39–40. 
87 Prehearing Information Exchange, 40 C.F.R. § 22.19(a) (2007). 
88 The powers and duties of an ALJ are subject to the published EPA rules, and they 
preside subject to rules set forth at 40 C.F.R. § 22.4(c). These powers are quite extensive. 
Id. The ALJ is responsible for conducting the formal proceeding, interpreting the law, and 
applying agency regulations and policies in the course of an administrative adjudication. 
Id. They are EPA employees, but in order to assure their independence, ALJs are not sub-
ject to agency personnel evaluation or sanctions and their compensation is set by the fed-
eral Office of Personnel Management, an independent agency. See 5 C.F.R. § 930.205(a). 
EPA can take disciplinary action against an ALJ only for good cause and before the federal 
Merit Systems Protection Board. Id. § 930.211(a). 
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heard in the administrative hearing.89 This process structures the hear-
ing around a predetermined evidentiary base.90 If any further discovery 
beyond the prehearing exchange is considered to be necessary, EPA 
must file a motion to compel discovery.91 At this point in the proceed-
ing the respondent must exchange its relevant information too, and 
EPA has an opportunity to object to documents contained therein. This 
phase is important in the hearing process: since the parties are bound 
by the pre-hearing process, no additional information may be offered 
at the hearing that was not already produced.92 The Part 22 regulations 
specifically set forth the nature of the information required for the 
prehearing exchange, and they take special note of penalty informa-
tion by requiring EPA to explain and justify its penalty request.93 If 
EPA’s complaint sets forth a specific penalty amount, the Part 22 rules 
require that the complainant, EPA, “shall explain . . . how the proposed 
penalty was calculated in accordance with any criteria set forth in the 
Act.”94 If EPA has elected to plead generally without specifying a pen-
alty amount, Part 22 requires that the complainant’s prehearing infor-
mation exchange must set forth all the facts that it believes are relevant 
to the calculation of a penalty for respondent’s alleged violations.95 In 
this case, EPA must file a specific penalty amount within fifteen days of 
the respondent’s prehearing exchange filing, along with an explana-
tion of the penalty calculation.96 Similarly, the respondent must then 
supplement its prehearing exchange with any arguments it plans to 
present to justify reduction or elimination of the proposed penalty.97 
 These procedural requirements suggest that the issue of the size of 
the administrative penalty sought by EPA is one that requires early dis-
closure and that EPA must justify its request in its administrative plead-
ings. These rules also reflect a desire to tie specific remedial requests to 
statutory penalty factors or existing EPA penalty policies rather than 
random, exorbitant figures. Certainly, the Agency’s stated policy in its 
                                                                                                                      
89 40 C.F.R. § 22.19(a). 
90 See id. 
91 Id. § 22.19(e). Other discovery is permitted. Other Discovery, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 
40,160–62 ( July 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22). 
92 40 C.F.R. § 22.19(a)(1). Information required in the prehearing exchange that is 
not submitted shall not be admitted into evidence at hearing, except as provided in 40 
C.F.R. § 22.22(a). Id. 
93 Id. § 22.19(a)(3). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. § 22.19(a)(4). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. § 22.19(a)(3). 
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own rules has been to impose a disciplined method of decisionmaking 
for its enforcement personnel to use in explaining how they arrived at 
their civil penalties. 
E. Securing Settlements Prior to Hearing 
 The administrative penalty process is extremely successful in secur-
ing settlements prior to the hearing. Prehearing ADR and other settle-
ment negotiation will usually dispose of ninety percent of the filed cases 
through the CAFO settlement technique. As a result, only about ten 
percent of the filed cases, or several hundred per year, actually move 
forward to the administrative hearing. These contested cases usually 
are characterized by large dollar penalty amounts, high capital expen-
ditures required to come into compliance, or, more rarely, a point of 
law needing interpretation. This ten percent slice of filed cases is over-
whelmingly heard not on questions of basic liability, but rather in order 
to contest the penalty calculation contained in EPA’s complaint. Most 
of the liability questions are resolved by a prehearing Motion for Accel-
erated Decision, a form of administrative summary judgment.98 To the 
extent that the underlying liability is still contested at the hearing, how-
ever, EPA must present its prima facie case, and the respondent is then 
accorded an opportunity to present its defenses.99 EPA may prevail only 
if it proves every contested issue by a preponderance of the evidence.100 
 Once liability is found, the proceeding moves to its second stage, the 
penalty determination. This bifurcated process sets the penalty in the 
form of a written opinion rendered after the hearing. During the penalty 
phase of the hearing, EPA presents evidence on how its penalty policy 
should apply to the case at hand. The principal EPA witness on this issue 
is the program person who originally calculated the proposed penalty. To 
buttress its penalty arguments, EPA will also present evidence on admin-
istrative penalties previously ordered for respondents having been found 
to have committed comparable violations. This evidence will attempt to 
establish a penalty norm for the ALJ to follow. After EPA presents its 
penalty case, the respondents will then present their response, raising 
such issues as the inability to pay or to continue in business. Both re-
spondents and EPA remain bound to the penalty-related information 
                                                                                                                      
98 See 40 C.F.R. § 22.20(a). The Motion for Accelerated Decision may be granted at any 
time by the Presiding Officer to either party if there is no issue of material fact and a party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In addition, it can be granted to the respon-
dent if EPA has failed to establish a prima facie case. Id. 
99 Id. § 22.24(a). 
100 Id. § 22.24(b). 
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produced during the prehearing information exchange. When the 
amount of penalty is high enough respondents will present testimony 
from outside economic experts to reinforce their case. 
F. Reaching Decision in the Administrative Hearing 
 ALJs do not rule from the bench, but rather provide the parties 
with a period of time to prepare and submit briefs after the hearing.101 
After receiving the briefs, a written ruling is issued by the ALJ.102 De-
spite its nonjudicial, administrative nature, this entire process is not an 
expeditious one for either EPA or the party charged with the violation. 
For those few cases that are not settled, case resolution usually takes 
between eighteen and twenty-four months to move from facility inspec-
tion to the ALJ’s written opinion. Furthermore, the process need not 
end here since appeal may be taken to EPA’s EAB and this could fur-
ther extend the decisionmaking time period.103 In practice, these ap-
peals almost always are initiated by respondent. Under EPA’s Part 22 
rules, the EAB serves as the final Agency decisionmaker for administra-
tive penalty actions.104 As such, the EAB is “responsible for assuring 
consistency in Agency adjudications by all of the ALJs and RJOs.”105 The 
scope of the EAB review is limited to those issues raised during the ad-
ministrative proceeding and the Initial Decision, matters as to subject 
matter jurisdiction, and anything additional the EAB decides should be 
included.106 As the data below reveals, very few cases make it to the EAB 
for administrative appellate review, and the EAB does not appear to 
exert much supervisory influence to assure consistency or conformity 
with EPA rules. Theoretically, an EAB decision could be appealed to 
the federal courts for further review.107 
                                                                                                                      
101 Id. § 22.26. 
102 See id. § 22.27(a). 
103 Id. 
104 See 40 C.F.R. § 22.4(a); Nancy B. Firestone, The Environmental Protection Agency’s En-
vironmental Appeals Board, 1 Envtl. L. 1, 1 (1994); William A. Tilleman, Environmental Ap-
peal Boards: A Comparative Look at the United States, Canada, and England, 21 Colum. J. 
Envtl. L. 1, 3 (1996). After Post-Hearing Briefs have been submitted summarizing the 
evidence presented at hearing and the legal positions of the parties, the Presiding Officer 
will issue a written ruling, called an Initial Decision, in which the Presiding Officer makes 
findings of fact, draws conclusions of law, and, when appropriate, imposes some form of 
relief to address a respondent’s violations. 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(a). 
105 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 ( July 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22). 
106 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(c). 
107 See id. § 23.12. In the few judicial review cases that examine administratively as-
sessed civil penalties, EPA penalties have been accorded great deference upon later court 
review and are usually tested under an abuse of discretion standard. See Pepperell Assocs. v. 
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III. Empirical Examination of EPA’s Administrative Civil 
Penalty Practices 
A. Collecting Data Concerning EPA Administrative Penalties 
 This Article analyzes administrative enforcement data derived 
from EPA reports over the five year period spanning from 1999 to 2004. 
There has been very little scholarly attention given to administrative 
enforcement sanctions and extremely little consideration of the impact 
of the ALJ system of decisionmaking on civil penalties suggested by EPA 
enforcement officials. In fact, EPA provides no public information on 
the subject of administrative enforcement besides annual totals and the 
value of the penalties imposed.108 The principal purposes of the re-
search in this Article were to examine EPA’s assessment of civil or fi-
nancial penalties through this administrative enforcement mechanism 
and to determine the extent to which statutory and agency penalty 
policies affected the actual imposition of financial penalties. More gen-
erally, this research is intended to examine how EPA handles the discre-
tion that it has in the imposition of civil penalties. The main objectives 
of this work are to address three tasks: 
(1) To evaluate the civil penalty assessment process in the first instance 
by identifying the initially proposed penalty amounts as reported in the 
administrative decisionmakers’ opinions and compare them to the final 
penalties actually assessed (the Start/Finish comparison); 
 
(2) To ascertain the frequency with which administrative decisionmak-
ers alter EPA’s proposed penalties and determine which of the statutory 
adjustment factors identified in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), TSCA, CAA, CWA, RCRA, and EPA penalty 
policies, if any, are utilized in making those adjustments; and 
                                                                                                                      
EPA, 246 F.3d 15, 29 (1st Cir. 2001) (reviewing CWA penalties for abuse of discretion); 
Kelly v. EPA, 203 F.3d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2000) (deciding that an abuse of discretion by an 
agency involves a decision made without a rational explanation, that departs from estab-
lished policies, or that rests on an impermissible basis); see also Newell Recycling Co. v. 
EPA, 231 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2000); All Regions Chem. Labs, Inc. v. EPA, 932 F.2d 73, 
75 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying the Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A) standard of 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
But see 3M Co. (Minn. Mining & Mfg.) v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (re-
jecting EPA’s interpretation of § 2462 of TSCA’s statute of limitations in administrative 
penalty cases). 
108 See Envtl. Integrity Project, supra note 16, at 10 app.I. Often, those statistics are 
criticized as being unduly inflated by EPA by the inclusion of amnesty agreements and 
default judgments that are unlikely to be collected. See id. at 6. 
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(3) To determine which of the statutory and EPA adjustment factors is 
most commonly cited in case decisions that make civil penalty adjust-
ments upwards or downwards. 
B. EPA’s Administrative Enforcement System: Points of Termination 
 The administrative enforcement system is an enforcement process 
that is comprised of a number of steps.109 After a matter is set for en-
forcement by EPA regional officials, it can be terminated in a number 
of different fashions.110 The discussion below outlines the four princi-
pal ways in which an administrative enforcement action can end. These 
steps are important to properly understand in order to put the follow-
ing empirical results into perspective. In addition, the data collected for 
this research uses the labels set forth in the subsections that follow. 
1. The CAFO 
 The CAFO is developed when the parties to an enforcement case 
settle a matter.111 It is a two-part document consisting of a Consent 
Agreement and Final Order.112 The Consent Agreement sets forth the 
specific terms and conditions of the settlement and includes: the 
amount and terms of payment of any penalty; a statement by respon-
dent admitting the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint; a waiver 
by respondent of its right to appeal the CAFO; terms of compliance or 
corrective action tasks to be performed by the respondent; terms and 
conditions of any SEPs; releases of liability; and reservations of rights or 
authorities for the complainant.113 As its name suggests, the Consent 
Agreement comprises the terms of the settlement between the gov-
ernment and the charged party.114 It contains the amount of any civil 
penalty imposed under the Agreement and the parties’ consent to the 
assessment of any stated civil penalty.115 The Consent Agreement does 
not terminate the proceeding by itself.116 The conclusion comes when 
the EPA regional official or the EAB headquarters issues a Final Order 
                                                                                                                      
109 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 22. 
110 See id. §§ 22.17–.20, 22.31–.32. 
111 Id. § 22.18(b)(2). 
112 Id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 40 C.F.R. § 22.18(b)(3). 
116 See id. 
200 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 35:175 
in the case.117 The Final Order serves as the final Agency action in the 
proceeding and it ratifies the settlement terms set forth in the Consent 
Agreement.118 Actually, the party’s liability for civil penalties for the 
charged offenses is finally resolved only when EPA receives “full pay-
ment” for any violations of law.119 The release is final when the check 
clears. 
2. Default Orders 
 Default Orders address “failure [of a respondent] to file a timely 
answer to the complaint; upon failure to comply with the information 
exchange requirements of § 22.19(a) or an order of the Presiding Offi-
cer; or upon failure to appear at a conference or hearing.”120 The cen-
tral idea is that a charged party may be considered to be in default un-
der each of the stated scenarios and that a Default Order may terminate 
the proceeding.121 Most civil litigation systems contain similar provisions 
in their rule structures.122 Under the EPA rules, “[w]hen the Presiding 
Officer finds that default has occurred, he shall issue a [D]efault 
[O]rder against the defaulting party as to any or all parts of the pro-
ceeding,” unless the record indicates a “good cause” rationale why a De-
fault Order should not be issued.123 In the usual case, the matter is 
ended with the Default Order and the recommended penalties become 
part of the order.124 
3. The Initial Decision 
 The Initial Decision is the judgment issued by the ALJ following 
the full administrative hearing and after the period reserved for filing 
briefs.125 Not surprisingly, it includes findings of fact, conclusions of law 
or discretion, recommended civil penalty assessments, if appropriate, 
and a corrective action order or compliance order.126 The EPA Part 22 
                                                                                                                      
117 See id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. § 22.18(c). 
120 Id. § 22.17(a). 
121 40 C.F.R. § 22.17(a). 
122 See generally 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2681 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the history and pol-
icy of default judgments in civil litigation systems). 
123 40 C.F.R. § 22.17(c). 
124 Id. § 22.17(d). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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rules require that the penalty decision be explained in the ALJ’s Initial 
Decision and state that the amount of the civil penalty be determined 
based on “evidence in the record” and in accordance with “any penalty 
criteria set forth in the Act.”127 The rules explicitly direct the decision-
maker to “explain in detail . . . how the penalty to be assessed corre-
sponds to any [statutory] penalty criteria.”128 Significantly, if the Initial 
Decision sets the civil penalty at an amount different from that pro-
posed by EPA, this discrepancy must be explained with specific reasons 
given for an increase or decrease.129 The drafters of the rule intended 
that the Initial Decision explain in writing the penalty calculation be-
fore making it final.130 The Initial Decision automatically becomes a 
Final Order within forty-five days unless the respondent: (1) moves to 
reopen the hearing; (2) files an appeal to the EAB; (3) files a motion to 
set aside a default order; or (4) the EAB elects to review the matter on 
its own accord.131 If none of these steps are taken, the Initial Decision 
becomes final and, the respondent waives its right to have a court re-
view the decision.132 
4. Final Orders 
 The Initial Decision will become a Final Order if none of the mo-
tions or appeals mentioned above are granted.133 However, the EAB 
maintains an independent right to review these ALJ Initial Decisions on 
“its own initiative.”134 From the statistics discussed in Part III of this Ar-
ticle,135 this prerogative is infrequently exercised.136 When the EAB 
elects to review the determination, however, it will review the entire re-
cord de novo and will issue a final decision that either “shall adopt, 
modify, or set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law or discre-
                                                                                                                      
127 Id. § 22.27(b). 
128 Id. 
129 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b); see Lisa, supra note 23, at 43 (“[A] Presiding Officer is re-
quired to consider any Agency penalty policies that are applicable to the case, but is not 
required to follow these policies in calculating a penalty as long as an adequate explana-
tion as to the deviation from the policies is provided.”). 
130 40 C.F.R. § 22.27 (a)–(b). 
131 Id. § 22.27(c)(1)–(4); see also id. §§ 22.28(a) (motion to reopen a hearing), 22.30(b) 
(review initiated by the EAB). 
132 Id. § 22.27(d). Appealing the decision through the EAB preserves that right, al-
though the data fail to identify many instances of the parties choosing to do so. Id. 
133 Id. § 22.31. 
134 Id. § 22.27(c)(4). 
135 See discussion infra Part III. 
136 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
202 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 35:175 
tion contained in the decision.”137 Although the EAB makes a de novo 
review of penalty determinations, “[T]he Board generally will not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the presiding officer absent a showing 
that the presiding officer has committed an abuse of discretion or a 
clear error in assessing the penalty.”138 The Part 22 rules indicate that a 
penalty will be scrutinized in cases where the ALJ has chosen not to ap-
ply EPA’s penalty policies or the penalty assessed falls outside the range 
of penalties provided for by such policies.139 In these cases, the EAB 
“will closely scrutinize the ALJ’s reasons for choosing not to apply the 
policy to determine [whether the reasons] are compelling.”140 From 
the language used in these EPA rules, it would seem that the EAB in-
tended to supervise ALJ civil penalties and to enforce the EPA’s guid-
ance and statutory directives on penalty design.141 While some EAB 
precedent suggests that the EPA penalty policies are merely suggestive 
and not binding on the ALJ,142 a number of cases have reversed ALJ 
penalty decisions when they departed from the result that would have 
been obtained from application of the policy.143 The small number of 
penalty cases actually reaching the EAB indicates that the exercise of 
this supervisory function is occasional at best.144 
                                                                                                                      
137 40 C.F.R § 22.30(f). 
138 Predex Corp., 7 E.A.D. 591, 597 (1998); see Phoenix Constr. Servs., 11 E.A.D. 379, 
390 (2004) (stating that the Board will “ordinarily defer to a presiding officer’s factual 
findings where credibility of witnesses is at issue”); Carroll Oil Co., 10 E.A.D. 635, 656 
(2002) (“[T]he Board will generally not substitute its judgment for that of an ALJ absent a 
showing that the ALJ committed clear error or abused his or her discretion in assessing a 
penalty.”); M.A. Bruder & Sons, 10 E.A.D. 598, 610 (2002) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(f)); 
Advanced Elec., Inc., 10 E.A.D. 385, 399 (2002) (stating that “the Board generally gives 
deference to a presiding officer’s penalty determination”); Britton Constr. Co., 8 E.A.D. 
261, 293 (1999) (citing Predex Corp., 7 E.A.D. at 597) (stating that the Board ordinarily will 
not substitute judgment of presiding officer). 
139 See 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b). 
140 Chem. Lab Prod., Inc., 10 E.A.D. 711, 725 (2002) (quoting M.A. Bruder & Sons, 10 
E.A.D. at 613). Compare Chem. Lab Prod., Inc., 10 E.A.D. at 734 (holding that reasons for not 
applying agency penalty policies were not compelling), and M.A. Bruder & Sons, 10 E.A.D. 
at 612–13 (finding that ALJ’s reasons for departing from the penalty policy was not com-
pelling), with Ray Birnbaum Scrap Yard, 5 E.A.D. 120, 124 (1994) (finding the Presiding 
Officer’s rationale for deviating from penalty guidelines compelling). 
141 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(f). 
142 See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau, 6 E.A.D. 735, 758 (1997). 
143 See, e.g., Carroll Oil Co., 10 E.A.D. at 661; M.A. Bruder & Sons, 10 E.A.D. at 616; Ad-
vanced Elec., Inc., 10 E.A.D. at 415. 
144 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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C. Sampling Strategy and Methodology 
 The central purpose of this research was to examine administrative 
enforcement civil penalty results in actual cases. To find reports of 
these administrative decisions, the research employed the Lexis EPA 
Administrative Materials Combined database.145 The analysis was lim-
ited by searching only those decisions issued between August 1, 1999 
and November 11, 2004, in order to coincide with the newly revised 
and promulgated Part 22 regulations issued in July of 1999.146 As stated 
above, these rules required that ALJs and other decisionmakers care-
fully explain their civil penalties and conform to EPA guidance and 
statutory directions.147 The five-year period that the research covered 
                                                                                                                      
145 This database contains EPA ALJ Decisions, EPA EAB decisions, EPA General Coun-
sel Memoranda, EPA RJO Decisions, and EPA Title V Air Permit Orders. Because the 
analysis primarily focused on administrative adjudications, this database was considered to 
be most appropriate for the research. 
146 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil 
Penalties and the Revocation/Termination or Suspension of Permits, 40 C.F.R. pt. 22. 
147 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135–136, 
136l (a)(4) (2000); Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(B) 
(2000); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2000); Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e) 
(2000). Each environmental statute contains an enforcement section which specifies both 
the nature of enforcement powers and the range of punishments that are available. See, 
e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). With regard to civil, noncriminal enforcement, these statutes set 
statutory maximum penalties per day of violation. See, e.g., id. Most of these statutes then 
offer a menu of factors that federal judges and EPA enforcement officials shall consider 
when setting the actual penalty amounts. See, e.g., id. Section 309(d) of the CWA provides a 
common example of such a list: 
In determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shall consider the seri-
ousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting 
from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to 
comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty 
on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require. 
Id.; see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(4); 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3); 42 
U.S.C. § 7413(e). These statutory adjustment factors do not explain emphasis or weighting 
of elements. In order to help itself, and to inform the regulated community as well as the 
federal courts, in 1984 EPA issued a general policy on civil penalties. EPA, Policy on Civil 
Penalties: EPA General Enforcement Policy GM-21 (1984). This policy document set a 
single set of EPA goals for penalty assessment and outlined a general process for the as-
sessment of penalties. On the same day, it issued a companion document intended to 
guide agency programs in the development of their own penalty assessment programs. 
EPA, A Framework for Statute-Specific Approaches to Penalty Assessments: Im-
plementing EPA’s Policy on Civil Penalties: EPA General Enforcement Policy GM-
22 (1984). This framework directs EPA officials to set preliminary penalty amounts derived 
from two basic components: a gravity element and an economic benefit element. Id. Since 
1984, EPA has issued statute-specific penalty policies that implement program-specific 
goals. See, e.g., RCRA Enforcement Div., EPA, RCRA Civil Penalty Policy 1–4 (2003), 
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also spanned two presidential administrations of different political par-
ties in an attempt to identify long-term trends unaffected by short-term 
political goals. The analysis focused on five environmental regulatory 
statutes that were considered to be fairly representative of administra-
tive enforcement actions across the range of environmental law. With 
this outlook, the data collection proceeded. 
 The initial search efforts attempted to find ways to eliminate ex-
traneous orders and motions from the large sample of administrative 
case decisions, numbering approximately 1100 for the five statutes 
combined. The main focus was to concentrate on those decisions dis-
cussing the issue of civil penalties and, more specifically, those explain-
ing how the proposed penalties were adjusted upwards or downwards 
by the ALJs. The decisions in the sample were classified as motion or-
ders, Default Orders, CAFOs, Initial Decisions, or Final Orders. These 
cases were then evaluated on the basis of whether they contained any 
discussion of penalty calculation. Those decisions likely to contain con-
siderations of adjustment factors were identified as “relevant” and sepa-
rate lists of relevant decisions for each statute were generated and ana-
lyzed.148 
 The large list of approximately 1000 decisions quickly shrunk. Of 
the total decisions under the CAA, TSCA, FIFRA, CWA, and RCRA for 
the time period under study, 597 were CAFOs, 246 constituted “other” 
orders and motion orders, and the remaining 190 were considered to 
be relevant decisions because they contained civil penalties. Relevant 
decisions were defined as those where a final disposition of the penalty 
issue was addressed in an adjudicated setting; in other words, anything 
not a Consent Agreement or Final Order.149 The chart below reflects 
these total numbers. 
 
                                                                                                                      
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/rcra/rcpp2003-fnl.pdf; 
Memorandum from Mary T. Smith, Dir. Field Operations & Support Div., EPA, to Field 
Operations & Support Div. Pers. ( Jan. 14. 1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/compli- 
ance/resources/policies/civil/caa/mobile/adminpenpol.pdf. 
148 The methodology used for the majority of the analysis was generated using tools 
available in Microsoft Access and Microsoft Excel, specifically the report generation and 
pivot table functions. This analysis was conducted for the entire 389 case sample and for 
the 191 non-CAFO case sample as well. 
149 Each of the five statutes’ penalty assessment sections were analyzed to ascertain 
what statutory factors the Presiding Officer was required to consider in assessing a final 
penalty for each violation. Importantly, a single researcher checked each of the cases to 
ensure consistency in data collection and overall accuracy of reporting. A report was gen-
erated for each case containing the entire information collected for the record. 
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Table 1: Total number of TSCA, FIFRA, CWA, and CAA cases identified for time period 1999–2004 
Statute 
Decision Type TSCA FIFRA CWA CAA RCRA 
CAFOs 188 100 220 82 7 
Other orders/ 
motions 51 32 83 77 3 
“Relevant” decions 35 33 53 42 27 
Total 274 165 356 201 37 
RCRA cases identified do not represent the total number for the time period, only those 
identified in the refined search specific to RCRA. 
 
 From these decisions, the cases were broken down into two catego-
ries: (1) CAFOs with civil penalties imposed and (2) relevant ALJ deci-
sions with civil penalties imposed. The final case sample contained a 
total of 389 decisions, including 198 CAFOs and 191 cases considered 
relevant for the purposes of this research. The Consent Agreement 
cases contained some discussion of penalty issues. The relevant ALJ 
cases were the main focus of the research analysis, in the hopes they 
would reveal the ALJs’ methods for constructing civil penalties in actual 
administrative case decisions. 
 As the numbers indicate, over half of the case resolutions were by 
way of CAFO settlement agreements.150 This large proportion should 
have been expected since many cases were settled for relatively small 
amounts of money, perhaps less than the cost of contesting the EPA 
charge.151 While these CAFO terminations were numerous, they often 
would not specify a penalty calculation method, and they represent 
compromise at the regional office level and not the full decision of an 
ALJ. Once these CAFOs were eliminated from the total of 389 cases, 
the research concentrated on the remaining 191 ALJ penalty decisions. 
 
Table 2: Total number of cases by statute represented in the sample analyzed 
Statute 
Type of Decision TSCA FIFRA CWA CAA RCRA Multi-Media 
Grand 
Total 
CAFO 69 20 37 65 1 6 198 
Final Decision 6 9 13 10 7  45 
Initial Decision 6 13 25 20 11  75 
Initial Decision/ 
Default Order 14 12 5 11 7  49 
Other 3 4 3 9 1 2 22 
Grand Total 98 58 83 115 27 8 389 
                                                                                                                      
150 See infra tbl.2. 
151 See Envtl. Integrity Project, supra note 16, at 10 app.I (presenting amnesty 
agreements with nominal $500 civil penaltes). 
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D. Observations Derived from the Data 
1. Comparison Between Proposed Initial Penalties and Final Assessed 
Penalties (the Start/Finish Comparison) 
 One interesting question addressed by the research was how suc-
cessful EPA was in actually imposing the civil penalty that had been ini-
tially recommended by the regional enforcement officials in their ad-
ministrative complaint. This inquiry was termed the “start/finish 
comparison” and it reflects the degree of discount that ALJs and other 
decisionmakers made from the initial EPA penalty demand. Consider-
ing all 389 cases in the large sample mentioned above, EPA’s adminis-
trative complaints had proposed approximately $24 million in civil 
penalties, while the final penalties assessed amounted to approximately 
$13.4 million. This amounted to a rather sizable 44% reduction in the 
start/finish comparison. Curiously, within this sample of cases, those 
that terminated with an early CAFO resulted in a 29% reduction over 
the administrative complaint request, while those that were imposed 
following an Initial Decision resulted in a 52% reduction. This result 
suggests that, in the aggregate, it was more beneficial to contest the 
administrative complaint through EPA’s ALJ system if the costs of doing 
so were less than the saved penalty. Successfully contesting the EPA-
proposed penalty would result in an additional 23% discount off of the 
proposed amount. However, as the data indicates, the penalty amounts 
are relatively small and the cost savings derived from successfully con-
testing EPA’s penalty might not be worth the effort.152 
2. Examining the Start/Finish Comparison in Relevant or Contested 
Administrative Penalty Cases 
 When the contested—or nonsettled—penalty-imposing cases be-
came the focus of the analysis, several interesting questions emerged. 
First, of these 191 relevant cases, what was the impact of the administra-
tive proceeding on the penalty amount that had been initially proposed 
in EPA’s complaint? Was it increased, decreased, or left at the requested 
amount? When considering the case decisions in this sample, 5% re-
sulted in an increase in the penalty initially proposed, 53% resulted in 
no change, and 42% resulted in a decrease in the penalty from the one 
initially proposed. This important data reveals that, for the most part, 
                                                                                                                      
152 The author compiled this data from several databases. 
2008] EPA's Stealth Method of Environmental Enforcement 207 
contesting the proposed civil penalty held little danger of having the 
ALJ or the EAB increase the initially proposed penalty. On the other 
hand, removing the small number of penalty increases from considera-
tion, the statistics reveal that by contesting the case, the charged party 
has a 56% chance of having the penalty proposed in EPA’s complaint 
affirmed unchanged, while having a 44% chance of having the civil 
penalty reduced. Perhaps the small dollar amount of the proposed civil 
penalties kept the contested case count down and the number of CAFO 
settlements up. 
 Second, of the small number of penalty increases in the sample, a 
defendant was four times as likely to have the penalty increased by the 
EAB than by an ALJ. In most of these upward-adjustment cases, the 
EAB was persuaded by EPA counsel that the ALJ had unreasonably low-
ered the initial penalty amount set forth in the administrative com-
plaint. This result suggests that there was some risk—though not 
great—of appealing an ALJ-issued penalty award to the EAB. Other 
evidence collected supports the idea that the ALJs regularly ruled in 
favor of defendants in civil penalty cases. In two out of three contested 
cases in the sample, ALJs decreased the initially proposed penalty, while 
in one in three cases, they did not change the recommended penalty. 
This would suggest that the ALJs were persuaded by the defendants’ 
arguments that the proposed penalty was excessive or unjustified. 
 In the cases that were appealed to the EAB, there was a 50% 
chance of decreasing the penalty imposed in the proceeding below, 
and this percentage was somewhat lower than the comparable figure 
for ALJ decisions. This statistic suggests that the EAB considers it to be 
its role to correct erroneous ALJ decisions and adjust the civil penalties 
downward as well as upward in cases reaching them. 
 Third, in terms of the amount of money involved in the relevant 
cases, the average penalty increase was $8904, while the average penalty 
decrease was $96,000.153 This ten-fold imbalance in amount should be 
considered in light of the fact that there were nearly ten times as many 
downward adjustments made as upward adjustments. With this much 
                                                                                                                      
153 Even excluding the smallest downward penalty change, $365, and the largest 
downward adjustment, $1.7 million, the average decrease was approximately $72,000. This 
amount exceeds the amount reported for the larger sample of 191 contested cases. The 
probable explanation for this fact is that the 122 contested cases in this relevant case cate-
gory might represent matters with higher initially proposed penalties, since they resulted 
in full ALJ case decisions, complete with a penalty calculus. Perhaps the other sixty-nine 
cases involved considerably less money, which would clarify why the ALJ did not explain 
the final penalty assessed. 
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money at stake, and with the odds of winning a downward penalty ad-
justment, it is surprising that more cases are not contested. Perhaps the 
CAFOs obtain similar penalty reductions without the expense and in-
convenience of contesting the charge. Also, there is a greater chance 
that challenging the initial penalty that EPA has proposed will be un-
successful and that, in the end, the ALJ will impose a penalty un-
changed from the amount requested by EPA. 
 Fourth, an examination of the civil penalty adjustments made by 
ALJs reveals unevenness in the distribution of the adjustments across the 
five statutes studied. Since the upward adjustments were so few, there 
was no clear difference in the small numbers involved. When comparing 
the no change results with the decrease or downward adjustments, how-
ever, interesting patterns emerged. The following illustrates the per-
centage of no change cases with the percentage of decrease cases in 
terms of the penalties imposed by ALJs, arranged by statute: 
 CAA (47.5%/47.5%); 
 FIFRA (71%/29%); 
 RCRA (41%/50%); 
 TSCA (81%/19%); 
 CWA (27%/66%). 
While there was an even chance of penalty decrease or no change in 
the CAA, with RCRA (50%), and the CWA (66%), there was an even or 
better chance of penalty reduction. In the FIFRA (71%) and TSCA 
(81%) cases, the odds were in favor of no change in the proposed pen-
alty amount, suggesting that challenging the initial penalty figure was a 
long shot at best. There is no obvious explanation for this discrepancy 
between statutes. The lesson that this data provides is that the chances 
of a downward civil penalty adjustment are much greater with the CAA, 
RCRA, and the CWA than with FIFRA and TSCA. It is unclear why 
there would consistently be erroneous, high civil penalty demands by 
EPA, but that the FIFRA and TSCA penalty requests would be more ac-
curate and legally defensible. 
3. How Frequently Is the Civil Penalty Calculation Explained? 
a. Providing a Civil Penalty Explanation: Overall Statistics 
 Analyzing the 191 case decisions that imposed administrative civil 
penalties, the opinions reflect an uneven degree of attention to the 
need for explanation of how the penalty was determined. All in all, the 
research determined that only 122 of the 191 penalty-imposing deci-
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sions in the sample actually contained any explanation of penalty set-
ting as clearly required by the EPA Part 22 rules. This represented an 
overall 64% compliance rate with this clear procedural mandate. In the 
other 36% of the penalty-imposing case decisions, EPA’s administrative 
enforcement system provided no explanation for its final penalty.154 
The surprising conclusion derived from this data was that EPA’s admin-
istrative enforcement system regularly ignored provisions of the 
Agency’s own rules in the implementation of its penalty process. With 
little public oversight of this internal Agency process and little objec-
tion to the actual civil penalties imposed by it, there appears to be little 
or no incentive for EPA to enforce its own rules against itself. 
 When broken down by level in the administrative enforcement 
system, the frequency of penalty explanations also varied to a signifi-
cant extent. Interestingly, 72% of the ALJ-written opinions contained 
discussions of penalty design and calculation. This figure reflects the 
fact that a relatively high level of compliance with the Part 22 direction 
had been achieved in ALJ practice.155 That being said, 28% of the ALJ 
case decisions omitted this required element. When the analysis shifted 
to the decisions of the EPA EAB, the percentage of opinions containing 
a penalty discussion actually fell to 52% of the decisions in the sample. 
Finally, 57% of decisions made at the regional level by a RJO explained 
the penalty results. The overall statistics reveal a striking lack of compli-
ance with the explicit mandate of the Part 22 rules.156 Apparently, the 
case decisionmakers often impose a financial penalty, but they do not 
justify it with any consideration of the statutory or administrative pen-
alty adjustment factors. 
b. Following the EPA Penalty Policy or Guidance 
 Examination of the subset of the 122 case decisions where some 
explanation of the civil penalty’s calculation was given presented a 
number of interesting patterns. First, in these cases the frequency of 
explicitly applying the statutory or EPA penalty policy varied greatly 
                                                                                                                      
154 If the 198 penalty-imposing CAFO settlements are considered separately, these de-
cisions provided a calculation method only forty-two percent of the time. This is signifi-
cantly less than the rate of explanation in the contested decisions, which had an overall 
explanation rate of sixty-four percent. 
155 See 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) (2007) (“The Presiding Officer shall consider any civil pen-
alty guidelines issued under the Act. The Presiding Officer shall explain in detail in the 
[I]nitial [D]ecision how the penalty to be assessed corresponds to any penalty criteria set 
forth in the Act.”). 
156 See id. 
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across the five environmental statutes being studied: CAA (31%), FI-
FRA (58%), RCRA (71%), TSCA (59%), and CWA (13%). In all of 
these cases some explanation was provided, just not one that refer-
enced the relevant penalty policy. It is not exactly clear why such a dis-
crepancy exists among the five statutes. 
4. What Adjustment Factors Affect Penalty Design? 
 Environmental statutes authorize enforcement actions and set 
maximum penalties allowed per violation under each statute.157 This 
consistent statutory approach ensures that EPA will have a high poten-
tial ceiling on the amount of civil penalties that it could seek to impose 
on those violating environmental standards in both administrative and 
judicial enforcement contexts. Since these statutes frame penalty liabil-
ity in terms of numbers of violations multiplied by the number of days 
of violation, the potential maximum for fines that might be charged 
under the law is extremely high.158 In order to provide some guidance 
to EPA and the federal courts on how to exercise discretion in the 
choice of civil penalties under the maximum amounts, Congress pro-
vided a short list of statutory factors that should be considered in the 
design of a civil penalty. Two main themes reflected in this legislative 
approach are deterrence and the denial of economic advantage to 
those who violate environmental law.159 Using the CWA § 1319(d) as an 
example, the following six factors were identified in the law for calibrat-
ing penalties: 
In determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shall 
consider the seriousness of the violation or violations, the eco-
nomic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history 
of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the ap-
                                                                                                                      
157 See Daniel Riesel, Environmental Enforcement: Civil and Criminal § 4.07 
(Law Journal Press 2002) (1977) (discussing penalty policies for various environmental 
statutes). 
158 Identifying the violations and determining the duration of the violations are crucial 
steps in establishing the maximum possible penalty under the law. After March 15, 2004, 
the maximum penalty per day of violation was increased to $32,500, creating the possibility 
of a $11,862,500 penalty for a violation lasting one year. Should there be multiple viola-
tions, the maximum penalty could rise by tens of millions of dollars. 
159 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1987) (finding the nature of civil 
penalties to include punitive elements, such as deterrence and retribution, as well as ele-
ments of recovery of unfair economic advantage gained by noncompliance). 
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plicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on 
the violator, and such other matters as justice may require.160 
Other statutes contain similar factors within the terms of enforcement 
authority.161 These statutory adjustment factor provisions were intended 
to influence both the prosecutorial discretion of enforcement officials 
in fashioning their penalty requests and the civil penalties actually im-
posed by federal courts and administrative decisionmakers. Like the 
sentencing guidelines in federal criminal law, the adjustment factors 
attempt, in a limited fashion, to restrain arbitrary punishments and to 
achieve larger statutory purposes.162 However, these statutes provide ab-
solutely no guidance on how these factors should be weighed and com-
pared in their use to calculate penalties.163 By themselves, these statutory 
penalty factors mandate little discipline on the part of federal judges 
assigning penalty amounts. 
 Within EPA’s administrative enforcement regime, ALJs and other 
decisionmakers operate under a system with a great deal more guid-
ance. The Agency’s Civil Penalty Policy serves as the general guidance 
for constructing penalties,164 but it has been supplemented by a number 
of statute-specific and general EPA penalty guidelines.165 The general 
policy creates a basic method for setting a proposed administrative pen-
alty. EPA must calculate a “preliminary deterrence amount,” which is 
                                                                                                                      
160 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2000). The CAA and CWA penalty 
design factors have been particularly influential to federal courts that have applied them 
to cases arising under other federal environmental laws without such provisions. See, e.g., 
United States v. Ekco Housewares, Inc., 62 F.3d 806, 814–16 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying CAA 
and CWA factors in a RCRA enforcement case). 
161 Riesel, supra note 157, § 4.07. 
162 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1A1.1 (2004). 
163 In civil penalty cases, the federal courts have employed two analytical approaches in 
their penalty design that have been termed a top-down approach and a bottom-up ap-
proach. Under the top-down approach, the court starts by calculating the maximum pen-
alty allowed by the statute. It then adjusts the penalty downward by using the mitigating 
factors set out in the statute. Using the bottom-up approach, the court determines the 
economic benefit derived from the environmental violation and then considers the statu-
tory factors to adjust upward the penalty amount. See Riesel, supra note 157, § 4.01[1]; see, 
e.g., Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, 897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(employing the top-down method); United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 187 F. Supp. 
2d 426, 444 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (using the bottom-up approach); United States v. Smithfield 
Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 353–54 (E.D. Va. 1997) (demonstrating the bottom-up 
method). Some courts vary their approach and permit either method to be used. See, e.g., 
United States v. Anthony Dell’Aquilla, Enters. 150 F.3d 329, 338–39 (3d Cir. 1998). 
164 See Riesel, supra note 157, § 4.04. 
165 See id. § 4.07 (EPA has issued over twenty-five different penalty policies to imple-
ment the statutory crude guidelines). 
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composed of the sum of two elements: the economic benefit compo-
nent and the gravity component.166 This preliminary figure is then 
modified through the application of adjustment factors.167 A number of 
additional factors are then added to the mix by a supplement to the 
1984 Civil Penalty Policy.168 These other factors include: the benefit de-
rived from delayed and avoided costs and the benefit of competitive ad-
vantage, “degree of willingness/negligence, degree of cooperation/non-
cooperation, history of noncompliance, ability to pay, and other unique 
factors.”169 Potentially, the penalty proposed and the penalty finally as-
sessed could be influenced by considerations of these wide-ranging and 
varied policies included within EPA’s civil penalty guidance. 
 The research analyzed the 191 case decisions that had imposed 
administrative civil penalties within the period under study. As above, 
sixty-nine decisions were removed from the sample because they failed 
to specify any calculus for the final penalty they imposed. This left 122 
case decisions where a penalty rationale was set out and these cases 
were examined to identify what factors were mentioned in ALJ opin-
ions. The intent was to determine what elements were most frequently 
mentioned and, therefore, were the most influential in the final deci-
sionmaking. The results revealed the following pattern in descending 
degree of frequency: 
(1) Gravity of harm: 55/122 or 45.1%; 
(2) Ability to pay/ability to continue in business: 31/122 or 25.4%; 
(3) Economic benefit from noncompliance: 31/122 or 25.4%; 
(4) Degree of cooperation/cooperative attitude: 30/122 or 24.6%; 
(5) Other factors “as justice may require”: 27/122 or 22.1%; 
(6) Degree of willfulness: 17/122 or 13.9%; 
(7) History of noncompliance/history of prior violations: 17/122 or 
13.9%; 
(8) Environmental damage: 11/122 or 9.0%. 
If this sample is representative of most ALJ judgments, the gravity of 
harm component appears to be the most influential factor affecting the 
setting of administrative civil penalties, as it was mentioned nearly twice 
as frequently as the next four items. That being said, the two economic 
                                                                                                                      
166 Id. § 4.04. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 A Framework for Statute-Specific Approaches to Penalty Assessments: Implement-
ing EPA’s Policy on Civil Penalties, [1 Admin. Mat.] 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
35,078 (Feb. 16, 1984). 
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factors, the cooperative-spirit element and the miscellaneous compo-
nent, all seem to have approximately equal weight in these cases. Sur-
prisingly, past noncompliant behavior on the part of the defendant does 
not seem to be a major driver of penalty determinations. 
IV. Conclusions About Administrative Enforcement 
Civil Penalties 
 After reviewing the EPA administrative enforcement data for the 
five-and-a-half-year study period, a number of conclusions can be made. 
First, administrative enforcement within EPA is definitely increasing, 
even if recent EPA data is discounted for being somewhat over-
inclusive. This appears to be the result of twin trends: a reduction in 
EPA and DOJ judicial civil enforcement and an increase in the use of 
administrative measures. If this de-emphasis of more formal judicial 
enforcement continues, EPA will employ these administrative tactics to 
seek both injunctive relief and civil penalties from violators of envi-
ronmental regulations in the future. Serious questions remain whether 
this increased reliance on administrative enforcement measures suffi-
ciently advances the environmental policy goals of the underlying stat-
utes. A more complete analysis of this greater emphasis on the adminis-
trative process is warranted to determine if environmental policy goals 
are being adequately served. 
 Second, the data collected indicates that administrative enforce-
ment can result in cost savings for the Agency by encouraging Consent 
Agreements as the principal method of resolving a large number of 
environmental complaints. While the EPA regional offices expend time 
and effort to secure these settlements, it would seem that more of both 
would be needed to expand judicial and administrative enforcement 
proceedings from their present levels. As the research shows, a rela-
tively small portion of the administrative complaints actually result in 
contested cases. Put into perspective, for the five-plus years of the study 
period, there were less than 200 reported ALJ case decisions under the 
five major environmental statutes. This suggests that EPA conducted 
adjudicatory hearings in approximately thirty-five contested cases each 
year, with hundreds more resolved by CAFO settlement agreements.170 
If this trend continues, negotiated settlements conducted at the re-
gional level will become the rule in environmental violation cases, with 
                                                                                                                      
170 As small as this number might seem, it is much larger than the fifteen reported civil 
lawsuits filed by EPA in fiscal year 2006. Envtl. Integrity Project, supra note 16, at 10 
app.I. 
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administrative penalty proceedings being an occasional event and judi-
cial enforcement serving as the rare exception. 
 Third, the review of the reported CAFOs and administrative case 
decisions reveals a surprising lack of adherence to EPA’s own rules of 
practice in administrative penalty hearings. This defiant behavior is not 
reflected by the parties charged with environmental offenses or EPA 
enforcement officials, but rather by the RJOs and ALJs who draft the 
CAFOs and write the case decisions. These are the decisionmakers who 
have been charged with the responsibility of implementing EPA’s ad-
ministrative enforcement system. In particular, the absence of specific 
civil penalty calculations in the final penalty decisions undercuts the 
objectivity of the system as a whole. The Part 22 rules specifically re-
quire this explanation in all decisions to enhance the transparency and 
accountability of these decisionmakers. In an agency adjudicatory sys-
tem where individual decisions rarely reach the public or the environ-
mental community, it would seem especially important to comply with 
EPA’s own disclosure regulations as a means of reinforcing the legiti-
macy of this important and increasingly utilized penalty process. Unfor-
tunately, this does not seem to be the case and one is left to wonder just 
how the particular civil penalties were calculated. The absence of co-
herent explanations certainly does not build confidence in the admin-
istrative enforcement system that is so isolated from public view.171 
 Fourth, the administrative enforcement process not only results in 
low visibility and negotiated settlements but has also produced an adju-
dication format that results in a high number of penalty reductions. 
The number of downward penalty adjustments greatly exceeds the 
number of upward adjustments. This fact suggests that ALJs frequently 
perceive EPA’s initial proposed penalty to be too high, rather than too 
low. It is not altogether clear why EPA enforcement officials would re-
peatedly err on the high side. One possible answer is that they expect 
the ALJs to reduce the penalty, so they set their bargaining and litiga-
tion starting point high. Perhaps the ALJs systematically discount the 
EPA claims as being excessive from past experience in prior cases. 
                                                                                                                      
171 There is no requirement in EPA’s Part 22 rules for public participation or even 
publicity about administrative enforcement. The design of these rules is organized around 
a bilateral litigation-type relationship between EPA and the violator. The one exception is 
the possibility for “any person” to intervene in a Part 22 adjudicatory proceeding. See 40 
C.F.R. § 22.11(a) (2007). This intervention is authorized along with the filing of nonparty 
briefs, but it is unclear just how anyone might know about the pendency of the enforce-
ment proceeding so as to participate. Id. §§ 22.11(b), 22.21(b) (indicating that notice of 
hearing is only given to parties). The same limits on outsider participation apply to appeals 
taken to the EAB. 
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Whatever the strategic reason might be for setting the initial penalty 
amounts, as the system has evolved, it rewards initial penalty challenges 
with a forty-two percent chance of downward adjustment. This adjust-
ment would compensate penalty challenges with a relatively high prob-
ability of financial reductions. 
 Fifth, with a limited number of cases reviewed by the EAB, ALJ de-
cisions, in reality, represent the final step in the EPA enforcement 
process. This conclusion means that a larger number of environmental 
enforcement disputes are being resolved by EPA’s ALJs without exter-
nal review by courts.172 The only review of these decisions is potentially 
undertaken by the EAB. However, the small number of EAB appeals 
granted suggests that few cases are seriously reconsidered. All in all, this 
adjudicatory process vests considerable discretion and authority upon 
EPA’s ALJs and in regional officials to determine how environmental 
noncompliant behavior will be sanctioned. 
 While there may be certain efficiencies and other benefits from 
such an administrative enforcement system, there is no assurance that 
the right cases are being kept inside the Agency, rather than being en-
forced in a more public way outside of EPA in court. Perhaps this kind 
of case selection represents a proper exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion. However, this increased emphasis on administrative enforcement 
potentially diverts more serious cases away from the judicial forum. Per-
haps these right cases will be resolved in the wrong venue. The expansion 
of this form of internal Agency enforcement, while simultaneously con-
tracting the amount of external enforcement, holds the potential for 
inadequately sanctioning more serious environmental wrongs. While 
deciding which matters are worthy of referral to the DOJ for civil en-
forcement would be essentially a matter of discretionary judgment, the 
rapidly shrinking number of judicially enforced environmental cases 
calls this selection process into serious question. 
 Sixth, the sustained increase in EPA administrative enforcement 
emphasizing negotiated settlements and relatively low civil penalties 
may provide the regulated community with the idea that environmental 
enforcement does not present a serious threat of court enforcement, 
and so may not deter noncompliant conduct. If those subject to envi-
                                                                                                                      
172 When environmental civil enforcement is undertaken in the federal courts, case 
decisions are matters of public record and often receive publicity in the media. Even set-
tlements proposed as consent agreements must be filed by EPA in the Federal Register for 
at least thirty days before the agreement is approved by the court in order to provide no-
tice for non-parties and an opportunity to file their written comments with the Agency. See, 
e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2000). 
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ronmental rules believe that regulatory compliance is something that 
can be negotiated away for a low-level sanction in a nonthreatening 
context, what will become of the deterrent effect of enforcement? Con-
ventional wisdom suggests that serious and costly EPA enforcement is 
unlikely and that environmental charges can be dealt with through 
publicly invisible negotiation. 
 In conclusion, the increased use of the administrative penalty 
mechanism is not a clear-cut improvement in the attainment of envi-
ronmental-quality objectives. In fact, this shift could actually represent a 
movement towards under enforcement and result in damage to the de-
terrent effect of all environmental enforcement. An unjustified and un-
wise over reliance on informal and less-costly methods of enforcing en-
vironmental law could have a deleterious effect on the willingness of 
regulated parties to meet their environmental obligations. If this actually 
does occur, the stealth system of administrative enforcement will have 
harmed environmental policy more than it has helped—certainly an 
unfortunate result. 
